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ARTICLE

THE TRANSFORMATION OF FRENCH
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND UNITED

STATES INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
James A. Fanto
I. INTRODUCTION

By all accounts, 1 United States institutional investors2
play an increasingly important role in United States corporate
governance. According to the generally accepted historical
account, institutional shareholder participation in corporate
* Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; B.A., University of Notre
Dame; M.A., Ph.D., University of Michigan; J.D., University of Pennsylvania. I
have benefitted from the comments of, and discussion with, Professors Arthur
Pinto, Roberta Karmel, and Spencer Waller, all of Brooklyn Law School. For introductions to French market authorities, I am grateful to Joseph Roslanowick of
Davis Polk & Wardwell, Paris office. Francois Champarnaud of the French Commission des Opdrations de Bourse, Sophie LIllias of Franklin Global Investor
Services and especially Alice Pezard, General Counsel of the Caisse des D~p6ts et
Consignations, provided valuable insights concerning developments in contemporary
French corporate governance. I thank Peter Bucklin and particularly Elias Tzavelis
for valuable research assistance, and George Bason of Davis, Polk & Wardwell for
giving me the idea for this Article. A 1994 summer stipend from Brooklyn Law
School helped fund my research for, and writing of, this Article.
1. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors,
43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991); Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist
Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857
(1993); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of
American CorporateFinance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10 (1991). But see John C. Coffee,
Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991).
2. By institutional investors, I mean the kinds with which we are familiar in
the U.S.: the public and private pension funds, mutual funds and bank collective
investment funds, but not banks, insurance companies and venture capital or LBO
funds.
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governance is one solution to the basic corporate agency problem identified by Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means.3 That
institutional investors would be an appropriate solution to the
agency problem is based on the following logic. Many institu-

3. See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 127-52 (1933); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC
and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837, 838
(1994). The account goes as follows: Corporations need to raise large amounts of
capital to attain the critical size necessary to compete in expanded domestic and
international markets. This capital raising requires the involvement of large numbers of investors. Because a typical investor has only h small amount of assets
invested in a particular enterprise, it is not cost efficient for the investor to closely monitor management. However, without shareholder monitoring, managers face
the "moral hazard" of operating a corporation in ways beneficial to them, not the
shareholders. See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW
AND REGULATION 124 (1992) ('[Mloral hazard' . . . denote[s] a condition in which
the knowledge that a third party will bear the costs of some harm creates a risk
that the actor may fail to take due precautions against occurrence of the harm.").
A major problem for corporate law scholars is to understand and to propose legal
solutions to this agency problem, that is, to achieve the most cost-efficient manner
of monitoring the agents/managers. See Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, Relational
Investing and Agency Theory, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1033, 1036 (1994) (citing OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 298-325 (1985)).
The recent focus on the institutional investor arose from the demise of
another solution. The market for corporate control, i.e., hostile takeovers, is a
time-honored U.S. solution to the corporate agency problem. See, e.g., Louis
Lowenstein, More Like Whom? Opening Remarks Before Columbia University Institutional Investor Project Conference on Relational Investing (May 6, 1993), in 18 J.
CORP. L. 697, 698 (1993). The threat of hostile takeover bids, so common most
recently in the 1980s, arguably deterred management from promoting their own,
not shareholder, interests. However, this monitoring solution suffered from adverse
publicity and became more difficult legally to use in the 1990s. See, e.g., Jeffrey
N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 124, 125-26 (1994) (discussing the demise of the hostile takeover). As its importance receded, the institutional shareholder came to be seen as
the preferred solution. See Lowenstein, supra, at 699. For some, institutional investment and monitoring is a more beneficial form of monitoring than the hostile
takeover, which may discipline managers in a distorting way (e.g., by encouraging
short-termism and other strategies that are not ultimately wealth-enhancing). See
Ayres & Cramton, supra, at 1037-38. However, not all scholars believe that all, or
even many, institutions will in fact adopt an activist position. See, e.g., Coffee,
supra, at 843-44; Coffee, supra note 1, at 1318-28; Rock, supra note 1, at 469-78.
Legal scholars have proposed changes to existing law to increase this institutional investor activism. See, e.g., Coffee, supra, at 838-42 (reciting history of
amendments to proxy rules); Black, supra note 1, at 821-30 (discussing legal impediments to shareholder activism); Bernard S. Black, Next Steps in Proxy Reform,
18 J. CORP. L. 1 (1992) (discussing further proxy reforms needed to promote institutional investor involvement). There has been a resurgence of takeovers recently,
but this development owes much to strategic acquisitions, as opposed to transactions financed by "takeover artists". See, e.g., Paramount Comm. Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
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tional investors own significant stakes in companies. It is costly for them always to use the "Wall Street rule" of selling their
stakes if they are discontented with management. Thus, they
have a strong economic stake in monitoring management, and,
for economic and legal reasons, they are encouraged to embrace a stakeholder model, with its emphasis on shareholder
primacy and investment return.4
The focus on United States institutional investors as a
solution to the basic corporate governance problem led scholars
to look outside the United States for comparable situations of
institutional investor monitoring. Scholars observed that, in
many other developed capitalist countries, certain kinds of
institutional investors played a significant role in corporate
governance.5 Scholars also asked whether, with certain legal

4. See Ayres & Cramton, supra note 3, at 1035, 1040-41; Coffee, supra note
3, at 892; Gordon, supra note 3, at 126 n.5. That institutional investors are willing to incur full monitoring costs although they receive only a limited percentage
of the benefits has been questioned. See Coffee, supra note 3, at 906; Edward B.
Rock, Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing, 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 987,
1030 (1994). As is clear from the title of the Ayres & Cramton article, a term for
certain kinds of institutional investors is that of "relational investors." See Ayres &
Cramton, supra note 3; Relational Investing, The Institutional Investor Project of
the Center for Law and Economic Studies, Conference at Columbia University
School of Law (May 6-7, 1993) (transcript of proceedings on file with author). The
relational investor is one who closely monitors management and is willing to hold
an investment for the long term in order to capture long-term gains. An example
is Warren Buffett, who invests for the long term through Berkshire Hathaway. See
Rock, supra, at 989. Generally, however, this definition of relational investor does
not cover the kinds of institutional investors that are the subject of this Article.
See Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 706.
5. See, e.g., Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and CorporateManagers: A Comparative Perspective 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1991) (discussing corporate
governance in Germany); Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the
Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871 (1993) (discussing structure of Japanese corporate governance); Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan,
and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993) (comparing corporate governance
in the indicated countries); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Investment
Companies as Guardian Shareholders: The Place of MSIC in the Corporate Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1993). But see J. Mark Ramseyer, Columbian
Cartel Launches Bid for Japanese Firms, 102 YALE L.J. 2005 (1993) (questioning
the value of comparative corporate governance studies, given the relative unimportance of governance in comparison to competition in the capital and product markets); Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons From Comparative
Corporate Law, 102 YALE L.J. 2021 (1993) (similar skepticism about the importance of corporate governance for the increase in shareholder value). This U.S.
scholarly work generated studies by European scholars on the role of institutional
shareholders in corporate governance in their countries. See, e.g., CONFERENCE ON
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changes, particular techniques and models of non-United
States institutional investor monitoring could be adapted to
the United States context.6
However, scholars realized that this adaptation in most
cases might be difficult or even impossible. Not only were foreign institutional investors unlike the United States ones-a
German or Japanese bank was a different institution from a
United States public pension fund-but foreign corporate governance situations were also products of complex cultural,
social and economic forces often unique to a particular country.
Although United States scholars might advocate borrowing
from abroad a technique of institutional investor activity, the
technique might not have the same effect in the United States
context, even if it were legally permitted,7 because of the different cultural, social and economic forces here.8
The focus of this Article is somewhat different from those
comparative legal studies.' My inquiry is what happens when
United States institutional investors, with their new importance and activism in United States corporate governance,

INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (Theodor Baums ed., 1992); EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW:
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON INTEGRATION AND HARMONIZATION (Richard M.
Buxbaum et al. eds., 1991); EUROPEAN TAKEOVERS-LAW AND PRACTICE (Klaus J.
Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1992); LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND THE BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE (Richard M. Buxbaum & Klaus J. Hopt eds., 1988).
6. See, e.g., Buxbaum, supra note 5, at 34-38.
7. The comparative law work often led to an historical understanding of the
legal limitations placed upon U.S. institutional investors, which limitations prevented such investors from performing many roles taken by offshore institutional
investors. See Roe, supra note 1; see also Mark J. Roe, Foundations of Corporate
Finance: The 1906 Pacification of the Insurance Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 639
(1993); Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in the Creation of a Mutual Fund Industry,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1469 (1991). See generally MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS,
WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
8. As Melvin Eisenberg has remarked, comparative corporate law studies do
not necessarily have to lead to improvements in or adaptations for U.S. corporate
law. However, in his view, they show possibilities available in other countries and
thus can be helpful in enabling U.S. scholars to think of alternative corporate
structures for this country. Melvin Eisenberg, Remarks at the Japan Society Conference: For Whom the Corporation? Corporate Governance in Japan, the U.S. and
Europe (Apr. 29, 1994).
9. The work of Richard Buxbaum lies closest to the orientation of this Article. He has identified as an area for additional study the consequences for corporate governance of "the globalization of securities markets and the global reach of
these American-and, to a lesser extent, Japanese and British-institutional investments outside their countries of origin, especially on the European continent."
Buxbaum, supra note 5, at 3.
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invest in non-United States companies and thus become participants in foreign corporate governance. That United States
institutions are increasingly becoming shareholders of nonUnited States companies is a recognized phenomenon that
owes much to globalization of the securities markets and theories of portfolio diversification." Moreover, in the
privatizations that are occurring on nearly every continent,
companies and governments are actively seeking the funds of
United States institutional investors."
This inquiry into the United States institutional investor
involvement in foreign corporate governance raises numerous
interesting, but difficult, issues. An initial issue is whether
these investors have exported their active role in corporate
governance. I suggest that certain kinds of institutional investors, for the same legal and economic reasons explaining their
involvement in United States corporate governance, have been
"activist" abroad.12
Further issues arise from the question whether United
States institutional investor activism is compatible with nonUnited States systems of corporate monitoring and governance.
Because foreign corporate governance systems are culturally
determined in a complex sense and because in many such
systems powerful institutions already monitor corporate management, United States institutional investors might be unnecessary, or might at best complement these foreign monitors.13
However, many non-United States institutional corporate
monitoring schemes grew out of, and are suitable for, a local
market with small capitalization where most corporate financing comes from large financial intermediaries. 4 As securities

10. See infra subpart II.A.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 39-43.
12. See infra subpart III.A. These will be the public pension funds, like
CalPERS, that generally follow an indexing strategy and do not have the need for
immediate liquidity required of mutual funds. See Coffee, supra note 3, at 860.
13. Ira Millstein has observed that this is a common assertion by those who
believe that no change is necessary for corporate governance systems in developed
countries. Ira Milistein, Remarks at the Japan Society Conference: For Whom the
Corporation? Corporate Governance in Japan, The U.S. and Europe (Apr. 29,
1994).
14. Cf. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 136-37
(1993); Buxbaum, supra note 5, at 4-5; see also Ramseyer, supra note 5, at 2006
(pointing out that, in a world where there is global competition for capital by
firms that are competing in the global product markets, firms cannot rely exclu-

6

BROOK. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XXI:I

markets become linked and as competition for capital becomes
more intense for enterprises competing in product markets on
a global basis, certain kinds of local corporate financing, with
their traditional institutional monitoring and corporate governance, may not survive. An important issue becomes whether
the United States institutional investor, who is increasingly
the typical investor in an economy where corporate financing is
primarily market-based, might have a significant effect upon
governance in a country whose economy is also being transformed into a market-based financing structure. In short, the
presence of United States institutional investors might be a
sign of impending change to a foreign corporate governance
system.15
Corporate law scholarship's recent awareness of the array
of possible solutions to the corporate agency problem cautions
against a confident acceptance of the inevitable triumph of a
United States-style market-based corporate governance structure throughout the world. A particular solution to the corporate agency problem is always a product of complex historical
forces that include, but are not limited to, economic and market pressures. 6 A particular corporate governance system and

sively on capital-raising in the local market if they are to survive).
15. It is thus ironic that the presence in a foreign market of U.S. institutional
investors, whose involvement in corporate governance has been partly inspired by
some European and Japanese models of institutional involvement, may suggest
that traditional institutional involvement in that market is no longer tenable.
16. Cf Coffee, supra note 3, at 842-43 (citing Roe, supra note 1, at 31-36). As
Richard Buxbaum has observed, one must understand the broad cultural constraints on ownership and control of private institutions:
(5) Finally, an initial comparative analysis of the underlying social,
political, economic, and even cultural constraints on potential structural
changes in the ownership and control of private firms in the modern
liberal economy is independently useful. It may help remind us of the
enduring validity of social theory in an era in which the discrediting of a
major wing thereof-Marxist theory-leaves important social issues, in
the West as well as in the East, unilluminated by self-reflection.
Buxbaum, supra note 5, at 6. Mark Roe, too, has emphasized the importance of a
cultural understanding of corporate structure: "Rather than using agency costs or
contract theory or judicial doctrine to explain this or that feature as mitigating or
reflecting managerial deviation from the maximization of shareholders' wealth, we
must consider the role of politics, history, and culture." Roe, supra note 5, at
1997; cf Joseph A. Grundfest, Internationalization of the World's Securities Markets: Economic Causes and Regulatory Consequences, 4 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 349,
360-61 (1990) ("Economics, technology, and politics shape each other and interact,
often in subtle but profound ways."); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Jurisprudence of
the Misappropriation Theory and the New Insider Trading Legislation: From Fair.
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a form of institutional monitoring may not be fully compatible

with global markets and global product and capital competition. However, noneconomic forces may maintain that system
and form."
An analysis of the effect of United States institutional
investors on the transformation of a country's corporate governance is beyond this Article's scope. 8 However, a given privatization, which solicits United States institutional investor
funds, might be a useful occasion to study the interaction between these investors and a foreign corporate governance system. Not only is privatization generally presented as a process
favoring markets and market-based financing, but it also
brings to the forefront the complex, often contradictory, cultural forces at work in the particular corporate governance system
and in corporate structure generally. Privatization could thus
serve as a "privileged" moment to study United States institutional investors' impact on a given foreign corporate governance system. 9
Because privatization is occurring throughout the world
and is itself a voluminous subject, this Article is limited to

ness to Efficiency and Back, 52 ALB. L. REV. 775 (1988).
17. Richard Buxbaum has argued that corporate governance systems may "converge," as opposed to having one system prevail: "[olur domestic experience with
the governance role of the institutional investors may inform the pending European experience even as it may be reciprocally shaped by Europe." Buxbaum, supra
note 5, at 21. Buxbaum has further noted that:
As United States funds begin to flow into European stock markets in
significant amounts, the American corporate governance situation, and
especially the institutional sector's evolution towards an active role in
corporate governance, will begin to have significance in the European
setting. At the same time, the different factual and legal structures within which European corporate governance relations are embedded not only
dictate a different pattern of assimilation for this new type of shareholder, but hold their own lessons for the future evolution of investor-manager relations on the American scene.
Id. at 21-22.
18. I understand that Professor Wymeersch is conducting a comprehensive
study of European corporate governance, and changes therein. See Eddy
Wymeersch, The Corporate Governance Discussion in Some European States, in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3-23 (D.D. Prentice & P.R.J.
Holland eds., 1993).

19. Social scientists have long proposed that moments of political debate, or
even political crisis, can bring to the forefront the transformation of social structures. Cf. James A. Fanto, The Making of a Literary Critic: Professionalism and
the Strategies of Authority 47-50 nn.86-91, 456-62 nn.680-88 (1988) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan).
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United States institutional investors' involvement in recent
French privatizations. French corporate governance in the
large, internationally competitive French companies is at a
crossroads: State dominance of these companies is gradually
declining because of privatization and a new corporate governance system for them is forming. On the one hand, in the
relatively small French capital market, financial institutions
may emerge as new sources of financing for French industry.0 On the other hand, French market authorities have recently been attempting to develop their capital market, which
should grow larger because of privatization, and European
Union developments are pushing France toward an increasingly liberalized market economy. This capital market financing, with its hostile takeovers and United States-style institutional investor activism, is potentially at odds with financial
institution monitoring in France. Thus, French privatization
highlights, and to a certain extent has led to, this moment of
transformation of French corporate governance. Moreover,
because the size of French privatization requires in the long
run non-French investment, particularly United States capital
to succeed, it brings the United States institutional investors,
with their newfound "activism," on the scene of the transformation and directly raises the issue whether they might have
any effect upon it.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II identifies investments by United States institutional investors made abroad
because of globalization of the capital markets and privatization. Empirical evidence shows that United States institutional
investors are investing offshore and in France. The evidence
also shows that, in light of massive privatization occurring
throughout Europe and France and because of limitations in
domestic market capacity, United States institutional investor
funds are needed for privatization, although the extent to
which their funds are immediately needed is at issue.
Part III reviews evidence of the offshore activism of United
States institutional shareholders and the reasons therefor.
This part will show that the leaders of United States institutional investor activism, the public pension funds, are similarly

20. See infra subpart V.B.2 (discussing the role of financial institutions as
"stable shareholders" in France).
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the leaders in foreign activism. More generally, however, all
United States institutional investors are increasingly taking
seriously corporate governance as an integral part of their
offshore investments. The strongest evidence of offshore activism by United States institutional investors is that an industry
has arisen to aid these investors to understand and to participate in foreign corporate governance.
Part IV analyzes existing French corporate governance in
large, globally competitive companies and current pressures to
transform it. Government ownership of most of these companies resulted in a corporate governance system at first typified
by complete government domination and later by a form of
government relational investing that left considerable discretion to management. This management power furthered the
government's goals because the background and formation of
company executives created a continuity of interests between
the state-owner and the managers. However, aside from privatization, powerful pressures in France are pushing French
corporate governance toward an Anglo-American style capital
market corporate financing. French government, market, and
business authorities have all tried to improve the depth, liquidity and quality of the French capital market, with the goal of
making Paris an important European finance center. More
importantly, pressure for change comes from numerous European Union directives dealing with corporate governance and
capital market issues that advocate a system of market-based
corporate financing and corporate governance.
Finally, Part V examines the most recent stage of the
ongoing French privatization, the involvement of United States
institutional investors therein and their effect upon the transformation of French corporate governance. A review of French
privatization suggests that it is putting into place an alternative to a corporate governance system based upon capital market financing. The privatization laws permit the Minister of
the Economy to create a small group of controlling shareholders that arguably insulates the newly privatized company from
market discipline. The full import of this core shareholder
structure remains to be seen: it may provide company management with the time to focus on long-range plans, or it may lead
to a closed, essentially oligarchic network of cross-ownership of
financial and industrial companies.
United States institutional investors, which have partici-
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pated actively in French privatizations, have generally been
suspicious of a structure that may favor stable shareholders at
their expense. However, given that the current French
privatizations are primarily aimed at the French domestic
market and that they have been attractively priced, United
States institutional investor concerns have had little effect on
the ongoing transformation of French corporate governance.
This Part concludes with the observation that United States
institutional investors may have more of an impact in further
French privatizations if domestic interest in them declines.
Even if they remain in their current subsidiary position, these
investors at least draw our attention to changes in corporate
financing and governance throughout the world, changes which
we cannot ignore in the increasingly global capital markets.
II. GLOBALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION
United States institutional shareholders will have an effect on foreign corporate governance only if they are making
significant investments abroad and if non-United States companies, or countries, need their funds. Thus, as a preliminary
matter, it is necessary to establish that United States institutional investors are investing abroad, particularly in Western
Europe and France. It is also useful to show that governments
and companies involved in privatization solicit the funds of
these investors.
A. Globalization of Investments
United States institutional investors are making significant offshore investments.2 ' Statistics suggest that in recent

21. See Grundfest, supra note 16, at 350 ("the evidence shows that international investment activity has grown tremendously over the past decade, and there
is reason to believe that international trading will continue to expand vigorously
in the future"). At least once a week an article in the financial press describes
non-U.S. investments by U.S. institutions. See, e.g., World: Investment
1994-Gazing Into the Crystal Ball, PLANNED SAVINGS, Jan. 1, 1994, available in
LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File (pointing out that U.S. institutional investors
attempting to counter "limited gains from equity investment" in the U.S. "have
been diverting seemingly endless flows of cash overseas"); Jacques Neher, Foreigners Look Beyond Gloom; Flood of Investment Money Favors Equities and Bonds,
INT'L HERALD TRiB., Nov. 4, 1993, at 19 ("'We're seeing U.S. private and institutional investors fast increasing their holdings in European stocks and bonds as
') (quoting Richard
part of a secular trend to investing outside the U.S ....

1995]

FRENCH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

11

years most of these investors have steadily increased their
offshore investments. 2 The flow of United States institutional
investors' funds into Western Europe and France has generally
followed this trend.23

Spiegelberg, Director of Corporate Communications at Merrill Lynch, London);
Rosie Shepperd, USA: US Capital Markets-Growing Taste for Global Equity,
Reuters Textline Euroweek, Dec. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library,
.TXTWE File ("U.S. institutional investment in foreign equity is increasing year by
year.. . . The success of any international stock offering is now largely dependent
on U.S. demand."). A sign of the U.S. interest in foreign investment is that it is
becoming increasingly easy in the U.S. to track performance of foreign companies.
See Larry Armstrong, For the Latest Line on ADRs, Get On-Line, Bus. WK., Sept.
19, 1994, at 104 (describing how it is possible to obtain on-line information about
foreign stocks).
22. See Thomas Olson, Mellon Intensifies European Efforts Through Venture
With French Bank, PITT. BUS. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1992, at 7 ("The U.S. institutional
investment market is generally judged to be a $3 trillion realm of pensions, profitsharing, endowments, public funds and the like") (comments of Mr. Adam);
Shepperd, supra note 21 ("Figures produced by Greenwich Associates put the total
(gross) volume of US institutional purchases of international equity at
$48.7[billion]."). Ms. Shepperd further observes that in 1992 "the 200 largest pension funds in the US have invested 12.5% of their portfolios abroad, which represents a steady 1% to 1.5% increase each year since 1988." Id. In addition, she
notes that "net purchases of European and Asian equity by US institutions" is
above "$25[billion]; this figure in 1982 was only $1.4[billion]," Id.; see also Norma
Cohen, US Pension Funds Increase Overseas Investment by 9%, FIN. TIMES, Sept.
15, 1994, at 16 (describing how U.S. pension fund allocated $22 billion to overseas
investments for the first half of 1994); Howard Murad, U.S. International Transactions, Third Quarter 1993, in SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 62 (1993) ("Net U.S.
purchase of foreign securities were a record $45.3 billion in the third quarter,
Net U.S. purchase of foreign stocks
compared with $24.1 billion in the second ....
were $24.4 billion in the third quarter, compared with the previous record of $13.5
billion in the second."); Pension Funds Can Shake Foundations of Financial Markets, FIN. POST (London), May 4, 1993, at 15 ("U.S. pension funds ... had invested just 4.6% [of] their assets abroad in 1991. But these were worth U.S.$125
billion. Similarly, the 6.6% of assets invested outside the U.S. by American mutual
[However] U.S. pension funds are projected
funds was worth U.S.$90 billion ....
to double the share of foreign securities in total assets to 10% by the mid-1990s.");
Rosie Shepperd, US Investors Cool on Foreign Issues, EUROMONEY, June 1994, at
10 ("Last year, large global funds based in the US poured record sums into international stock markets. Conservative estimates suggest that North American institutions invested $160 billion offshore. That figure dwarfs the total amount of foreign investment for the whole of the preceding decade.").
23. David Buchan, Scope for Plenty More, FIN. TIMES, July 12, 1994, at IV
("As a home for foreign investment, France has remained relatively attractive in a
European business climate that has depressed the 'animal spirits' of most investors."); James R. Kraus, Credit Agricole Extends Its Reach With New Crop of Financial Services, AM. BANKER, May 24, 1994, at 4 ("In recognition of the overseas
movement by U.S. investors, Credit Agricole, one of France's larger banks is expanding into U.S. financial markets by reorganizing their existing American offices.
Credit Agricole Securities will focus on distributing French and European securities
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There are basic reasons for offshore investment by United
States institutions. That a particular foreign company has
strong economic fundamentals or that companies in a foreign
market present favorable growth prospects are significant
factors.24 But the main reason for this offshore investment-portfolio diversification -- is based upon finance theory. In a global market environment, an institutional investor
reduces its risk by diversifying its portfolio, not only over a national market and its various industries, but also over the
global market.26 Thus, an overall decline in the value of in-

to U.S. institutional investors, such as pension and mutual funds, that are diversifying internationally."); Howard Murad, supra note 22, at 62 ("Net purchases,
primarily by large U.S. institutional investors, were largest for Western European
stocks. .

.

. "); Madlyn Resener, Europe: Shareholders of Europe, Unite!, INSTITU-

TIONAL INVESTOR (Int'l Ed.), Nov. 1993, at 50 ("Attracted by lower price-earnings
ratios and government privatization programs, and needing to diversify their equity holdings, U.S ....
institutional investors have dramatically increased their
investments in Europe during the past few years.").
24. An example of a generally favorable view of a particular market is the
recent investor perspective on France. See Barbara Wall, In France, Confidence
Despite Clouds, INTL HERALD TRIB., July 16, 1994, available in LEXIS, Europe
Library, IHT File ("Confidence in the French equity market is surprisingly buoyant
considering its leaden performance during the past 18 months. Analysts say that
the majority of French companies are basically sound and due to benefit from an
export-led recovery."). But see Steve H. Hanke & Sir Alan Walters, Too Clever by
Half, FORBES, Aug. 15, 1994, at 146 ("After pouring... billion[s of] francs into
French stocks and bonds . . . foreign investors have begun to withdraw funds ...
We would advise our readers to do likewise."). Investor enthusiasm, of course, can
change rapidly if investors are disturbed by fundamental problems affecting a
particular economy. Geri Smith et al., Mexico: Can it Cope?, BUS. WK., Jan. 16,
1995, at 42 (pointing out that after the recent free fall of the Mexican peso and
stock market "Mexico has shifted from a sure thing to a risky, developing country
in the eyes of foreign investors").
25. For a basic discussion of the unsystemic risks eliminated by portfolio diversification, see BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RA4DOIIm WALK DOWN WALL STREET 22837 (1990). See also William J. Baumol & Burton G. Malkiel, Redundant Regulation
of Foreign Security Trading and U.S. Competitiveness, 5 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 19,
23 (1993) ("As long as stocks in the portfolio do not move completely in parallel,
fluctuations in the fortunes of individual stocks will at least partially offset one
another and the resulting portfolio performance will be more stable than the fluctuations of the individual components.").
26. See Baumol & Malkiel, supra note 25, at 24; see also Grundfest, supra
note 16, at 362 ("Recently, however, investors have begun considering the benefits
of diversification across national markets. Thus, instead of merely diversifying
within domestic borders, investors now seek to hedge against domestic market risk
by purchasing foreign equities, bonds, real estate, and other assets."). Professor
Grundfest makes a point often repeated in finance literature: most investors are
insufficiently diversified and, thus, cross-border transactions are likely to increase
as the diversification theory is increasingly put into practice. Id. at 366. For more
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vestments in one country's market or industries could be balanced or hedged by growth in other investments in other countries.
Financial strategies and theories provide the rationale for
foreign investment by United States institutions. However,
institutions will not make these investments if their risks and
related costs outweigh possible benefits, or are so
unquantifiable as to make the investment unreasonable." For
example, the lack of liquidity of a particular foreign investment
or market may make it difficult for an investor to manage its
investment efficiently.2" A foreign market may be subject to
trading abuses that enhance the risk of unacceptable loss to an
investor.2 9 Moreover, there may be custodial and execution
problems with offshore investing that collectively impose significant risks and costs upon a particular investment. °

discussion of the benefits of international portfolio diversification, see Cheol S.
Eun, International Portfolio Diversification, in DAVID K. EITEMAN ET AL., MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS FINANCE 367-87 (1992); ALAN C. SHAPIRO, MULTINATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 395-409 (1992); BRUNO SOLNIK, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS

39-69 (1991).
27. See, e.g., Eun, supra note 26, at 383 (referring to possible high transaction
costs for foreign investments); SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 403 (describing barriers
to international diversification); SOLNIK, supra note 26, at 59.
28. See SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 403 ("The lack of liquidity-the ability to
buy and sell securities efficiently-is a major obstacle on some overseas exchanges."); Coffee, supra note 1, at 1318-21 (discussion of reasons for desire for liquidity
by institutional investors).
29. A frequently cited argument in efforts to improve disclosure and to address trading abuses in a non-U.S. market is that more outside investment will be
attracted to a market regarded as being free of trading abuses. Cf. SOLNIK, supra
note 26, at 60 (observing that "[i]f foreign markets were too inefficient a manager
would probably not run the risk of investing in these markets to benefit the domestic speculators.").
30. The costs arise from what are often termed "back office" matters. They
would include brokerage costs in making an investment in a foreign company,
costs associated with the custody of such investment, if it needs to be held abroad
(not in the form of American Depositary Receipts), and transactional costs involved
in clearance and settlement of securities transactions. It has been reported that
these costs are generally higher outside the U.S. See Baumol & Malkiel, supra
note 25, at 20-21. Not only can these costs be significant, but if custodial or settlement mechanics do not work properly, an entire investment could be jeopardized. These concerns are not purely speculative. One has only to think of the
U.S. "paperwork crisis" in the 1970s where back offices were so overrun with attempting to handle the transfers of certificated securities in the settlement process
that securities were lost and transactions not completed. For a description of this
crisis and its consequences, see MARSHALL E. BLUME ET AL., REVOLUTION ON WALL
STREET: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 116-27
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How these issues have been, and are being, addressed in
international investing is beyond the scope of this Article. It
suffices to say that there are ongoing national and international efforts to reduce the risks and costs of investing in foreign
companies for all investors.3 In fact, United States market
and regulatory authorities continue to create opportunities for
United States institutions to invest in non-United States securities while retaining the protection of the United States securities laws.32 United States institutional investors will thus

(1993). Professor Grundfest has rightly observed that, without technological advances in telecommunications and computers, there would likely be few international
securities transactions. See Grundfest, supra note 16, at 361-62.
31. On the international level, concerted efforts to improve the safety of crossborder investing has come from the Group of Thirty, an organization of market
authorities from the most developed countries. In 1989, the Group of Thirty published a report on clearance and settlement in the securities markets with a list of
recommendations that, if implemented, would help eliminate certain risks involved
in clearance and settlement of national and international transactions. GROUP OF
THIRTY, REPORT ON CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD'S SECU-

RITIES MARKETS (1989). The work of the Group of Thirty has been furthered by
other international organizations, see, e.g., INT'L SEC. MKT. ASSN, TOWARDS A
SINGLE EUROPEAN SECURITIES TRADING MARKET (1992), and by private market

participants, see, e.g., MORGAN GUAR. TRUST CO. OF NEW YORK, CROSS-BORDER
CLEARANCE,

SETTLEMENT, AND

CUSTODY:

BEYOND THE G30 RECOMMENDATIONS

(1993). In this country, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
worked to further the goals of the Group of Thirty. See Report of the Bachmann
Task Force on Clearance and Settlement Reform, Exchange Act Release No.
30,802, 57 Fed. Reg. 27,812 (1992).
32. In recent years, the SEC and the self-regulatory organizations ("SROs"),
such as the stock exchanges, have facilitated investment by U.S. institutional investors in foreign companies. The most striking example is the promulgation of
Rule 144A under the Securities Act of 1933, which permits an offering of certain
kinds of securities to qualifying institutional investors without the need for offering participants to comply with the registration requirements of the Act. See 17
C.F.R. § 230.144A (1994). It was thought that foreign issuers would be less reluctant to offer securities in the U.S. if they had a "safe harbor" from these requirements. See Sara Hanks, Rule 144A: Another Cabbage in the Chop Suey, 24 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 305, 350-51 (1990).
Rule 144A was partly inspired by a concern among U.S. market authorities
to maintain the dominant position of U.S. capital markets. This dominance would
erode if large, sophisticated U.S. institutional investors would go offshore to purchase foreign securities. Cf Baumol & Malkiel, supra note 25, at 21 (concern that
onerous U.S. regulatory requirements could cause U.S. investors to move offshore
for their trading in foreign securities). A debate is now underway in the securities
bar over whether the SEC is adequately accommodating foreign issuers that wish
to have access to the U.S. capital markets. The concern is not that U.S. investors
will stop investing in the capital markets, but that they will go abroad. See E.F.
Greene et al., Internationalizationof the World's Capital Markets: U.S. Regulatory
Alternatives, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SHAPING REGULATORY POLICY FOR THE
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likely continue to invest in foreign companies, barring a cataclysm in the international markets.
B. Privatization
Given that United States institutional investors are increasingly investing in non-United States companies, it is not

surprising to find that they are purchasing shares of privatized
companies and that governments and privatized company managers solicit these investors. To understand this process, it is
necessary to review briefly the structure of a typical Western
European privatization.
In Western Europe, privatization generally involves the
transfer of large, world-class companies that are owned or
controlled by the government, directly or indirectly, to the
private sector.33 Privatization is generally a complex political
and cultural process. As we shall see in the case of France, the
transfer is typically justified under the liberal economic rationale that such companies will be operated more efficiently and
productively if they are exposed to market discipline and freed
from the control and protection of the government.34 The ra-

CAPITAL MARKETS 1, 40 (1994) (arguing for more flexibility on the SEC's part in
allowing foreign companies to register their shares for offer and sale in the U.S.).
33. See GIUSEPPE FAJERTAG, PRIVATISATION IN WESTERN EUROPE 35-36 (1988)
(enumerating the kinds of privatization, including "floating all or some of the
shares").
34. See FAJERTAG, supra note 33, at 37; Yacob Haile-Mariam, Privatization of
State-Owned Enterprises and the Law: Issues and Problems, 7 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
35, 35-40 (1993) (discussion of the rationale for privatization); John Vickers &
Vincent Wright, The Politics of Industrial Privatisation in Western Europe: An
Overview, in THE POLITICS OF PRIVATISATION IN WESTERN EUROPE 1, 6 (John
Vickers & Vincent Wright eds., 1989) ("At bottom, there is a deep-seated suspicion
in neo-liberal circles of politico-bureaucratic compromises which usurp the role of
the market as the mechanism for allocating resources. Uninhibited, market-oriented, profit-seeking entrepreneurs are preferred to budget-maximising bureaucrats
and vote-maximising politicians."). Mary Shirley of the World Bank has explained
well this rationale:
The existence of private property rights is a second reason why
privatization results in better performance. Typically profit-oriented owners push their companies to perform better at lower costs and to be more
service- and client-oriented. Unlike the public owner, private owners are
usually quicker to change management and faster to respond to opportunities. This is due in part to the fact that private owners are motivated
by their own stake in the company and in part to the fact that they are
free of the political constraints that bind governments.
Mary M. Shirley, The What, Why, and How of Privatization, 60 FORDHAM L. REV.

16

BROOK. J. INTL L.

[Vol. XXI:I

tionale reflects a general dissatisfaction with, and discrediting
of, a government's ability to improve the economic welfare of
its citizens by operating directly large sectors of the economy.3" That a government may improve its own financial position by ridding the public budget of companies in need of frequent capital contributions also explains privatization.36
The transfer of a government-owned company to the private sector often involves the public sale of shares on securities
markets. Depending upon the company and Western European
country involved, this sale could be large in relation to existing
market capitalization. 7 This small domestic market may

S23, S27 (1992).
Even those who cite the above argument for privatization recognize that the
sale of a government-owned company into private hands will not alone transform a
company into an efficient organization. As Shirley further observes:
Typically, privatization works best when it is only one part of a larger
program of reforms designed to create an environment that promotes
efficiency. Such a program usually includes: trade reforms encouraging
competition and export; price reforms liberalizing markets; regulatory
reforms safeguarding competition by removing obstacles to private entry
and exit; and legal reforms assuring proper disclosure, enforcement of
contracts, and due process.
Id. at S29; see also Colin Scott, Privatization, Control, and Accountability, in CORPORATE CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY: CHANGING STRUCTURES AND THE DYNAMIcs
OF REGULATION 231-45 (Joseph McCahery et al. eds., 1993) ("However, it is apparent that ownership is only one aspect of industrial efficiency, and that competition
and regulation play an important role."). Thus, if a privatized enterprise has a
monopoly position (e.g., such as a public utility), the expected efficiencies from
privatization might emerge only if competition were somehow externally introduced
into the market. See COSMO GRAHAM & TONY PROSSER, PRIVATIZING PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 254-55 (1991).
35. See FAJERTAG, supra note 33, at 32-33; Vickers & Wright, supra note 34,
at 6.
The global economy also pushes governments to privatize. A company may
have difficulty competing globally if it is too closely linked with the policies of a
particular nation. If a company suffers losses, national economic welfare is hurt
when the government must cover the losses in its budget. See id. at 2 ("Economies
of scale in some industries are now on a European or world level: industrial decisions rooted in national politico-bureaucratic compromises are perceived as hindrances in an environment demanding flexibility and speed in decision-making."),
36. See FAJERTAG, supra note 33, at 33 ("If the public undertakings and services are transferred from the public to the private sector, the State will no longer
be in the position of having to subsidise them, taxpayers will pay lower rates of
tax because the State will no longer need money for public-sector subsidies, and
the users of public services will also, so the argument goes on, enjoy better services and lower prices, thanks to competition."); see also Vickers & Wright, supra
note 34, at 7-8.
37. See Vickers & Wright, supra note 34, at 8 ("A third financial reason for
privatisation, heard in Britain but more especially in France and Italy, is that it
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arise from the fact that, for various reasons, retail investors

have not traditionally purchased equity shares. A small domestic market may also be explained by the fact that there are few
institutional shareholders in a particular country. A given
domestic market may thus be unable to absorb all of the
shares of a privatized company.3" This domestic market limitation explains why a privatization often needs other than domestic investors to ensure its success. 9 Moreover, management of privatized companies may seek out foreign investors
because, in losing the government as primary capital provider,
management may want the greatest exposure possible to other
foreign capital markets and investors so as to maximize the
company's flexibility for future capital raising.4"
Consequently, in a Western European privatization, government authorities will generally structure a public sale to
include non-domestic investors. A certain portion of the offered
shares may be reserved for "international" investors.4 Given
the purchasing power of United States institutional investors,
governments often plan to sell them a large percentage of
these shares.42

fosters the growth of the stock exchange: it can widen capital markets by bringing
in many new investors and 'deepen' them by introducing mature companies with
strong market positions."). It is generally acknowledged that, with the possible
exception of the U.K., Western European privatizations have as one goal to boost
the size of the otherwise thinly capitalized European stock markets and to make
them more available for corporate finance. See Richard House, The 'Great European
End-of-the-Century Asset Sale, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Mar. 1993, at 87.
38. In the case of many European privatizations, their success is dependent
upon foreign buyers; the importance of foreign purchasers is even more significant
if domestic investors do not purchase expected amounts or if new pension funds do
not materialize. See MORGAN STANLEY & Co., GLOBAL STRATEGY & ECONOMICS:
EUROPEAN PRiVATISATION 9-11 (1993). In fact, one reason for a privatization is to
increase stock market capitalization and thus to make a domestic market more
liquid.
39. The need may not arise immediately, however, but only in later stages of
the privatization. See infra text accompanying notes 225-27.
40. Cf Vickers & Wright, supra note 34, at 18 (describing why managers of
government-owned companies might prefer to be free of government oversight so
as to concentrate properly on business goals).
41. Cf MORGAN STANLEY & Co., supra note 38, at 2 ("In many of the large
privatisations lined up in Europe, encouragement of the foreign investor will be
crucial to the success of the programme.").
42. See Leah Nathans Spiro et al., Wall Street's Global Power, BUS. WK., Nov.
1, 1993, at 102 (discussing the importance of U.S. investment banks in global
capital raising because of their "home-court advantage," i.e., their access to the
"well-developed U.S. pension and mutual-fund system"); Selling the World, ECONO-
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The support of United States institutional investors is
needed for successful privatization of Western European companies. In fact, competition exists for United States capital,
given the large number of planned privatizations in Western
Europe in the coming years.4 3 This need for United States
institutional money in a competitive situation suggests that
government and privatized company management should be
sensitive, and even accommodating, to corporate governance
concerns expressed by these investors. This observation raises
the question of whether United States institutional investors
are bringing abroad a corporate governance agenda.
III. THE "AcTivIST" UNITED STATES INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR

ABROAD
This part first explores reasons for United States institutional investor offshore activism on corporate governance matters as well as obstacles to such activism. It next describes
available evidence for the activism. Specifically, the evidence
shows that United States investors are concerned about corpo-

MIST, May 8, 1993, at 81 (reports are that U.S. funds dominate money that is
available for globalization).
43. The amount of privatization planned in Western Europe for the next five
years is projected to be in the range of $150 billion and includes (or has included)
companies in the U.K., France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden,
Germany and Greece. See MORGAN STANLEY & CO., supra note 38, at 3-8 (listing
countries and projected companies to be privatized); Dean Foust et al., Financing
World Growth, Bus. WK., Oct. 3, 1994, at 100 (discussing demands on capital from
countries around the world); House, supra note 37, at 87 (listing planned
privatizations in different countries) ("Will there be enough capital to satisfy everyone? There are some worrisome signs. Current capital flows into Europe will not
be enough to support the level of privatizations planned by European governments."); U.K: European Privatizations May Swamp Markets, Reuters News Service, Jan. 24, 1994, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, TXTWE File.
The power of global capital points to a significant political issue: the ability
of markets to dictate terms to governments. See Thomas L. Friedman, When Money Talks, Governments Listen, N. V'. TIMES, July 24, 1994, § 4, at 3 ("As more
countries have gone capitalist, there is a huge global competition for cash and
investors, so that governments can build roads, power stations and telephone systems that are the foundation for higher living standards."). Sometimes countries
will go to great lengths to attract the global capital flow. See Joseph Fitchett, A
'Traveling Salesman' in Hermes Tie; Tordjman Spreads the Word About France's
Improved Investment Climate, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 7, 1994, (Special Report,
French Economy), at II ("No effort is spared [to attract foreign investors. Last
month, a handful of U.S. pension fund managers-controlling $400 billion that has
to be invested somewhere-spent a week [being lavishly entertained] in Evian, the
spa on Lake Geneva.").
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rate governance in Western European companies, although for
reasons of cultural unfamiliarity their activism there is more
tempered than the activism they have recently displayed in the
United States.
A. Reasons for United States Institutional Shareholder
Activism Offshore
At a basic level, the reasons for institutional investor activism should be the same offshore as onshore. If product market and capital market pressures do not alone dictate corporate
productivity and total shareholder return, i.e., if corporate
governance matters, shareholder-owner oversight of the management-agent could improve corporate governance and productivity." This perspective also presupposes that investors
will not always find it economically feasible to sell their holdings when dissatisfied with management, rather than participate in corporate governance.4 5
Moreover, legal requirements that oblige United States
institutional shareholders to take an "activist" position in corporate governance are essentially no different for foreign and
domestic investments. If these investors must follow a "prudent man" rule as to their investments and if voting of shares
and other activism could benefit the funds they are managing,
the fiduciary duty would support investor activity offshore and
onshore.4 6 Although some uncertainty recently existed on

44. As Jeffrey Gordon has explained:
This [the statement that "[sihareholders and society generally will
benefit from a mechanism that replaces the firm's incumbent managers
well before the firm succumbs to competitive forces"] is based on an
assumption that corporate governance matters to the performance of the
firm and thus significantly affects performance of the national economy.
This assumption might be contested by those who believe that another
factor, such as technological innovation or education of the work force, is
the key variable and that governance, if it matters at all, is marginal.
Corporate governance matters, however, because management matters.
Gordon, supra note 3, at 124 n.1.
45. Even an important critic of the importance of institutional activism, Professor Coffee of Columbia would admit that there are cases when activism is likely. See Coffee, supra note 3, at 869-71. Thus, I shall not revisit here debates on
the general usefulness of institutional investor involvement as a response to the
Berle-Means corporate agency problem, but shall presume its utility.
46. Howard Sherman of the Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. observes
that, although there has been some uncertainty as to legal standards for funds
with respect to voting securities held abroad, parties generally conclude that there

20

BROOK. J. INTL L.

[Vol. XXI:I

whether private pension funds had to vote foreign shares,
Department of Labor guidelines stipulate that fund managers
exercise their right of vote in these cases in an informed
way." While these legal prescriptions do not mandate activism, they demand more than a cursory treatment of voting
rights or a "rubber stamping" of all management proposals.
No matter what the legal standard requiring the institutional investor to take seriously its oversight, the investor
must consider the potential costs of its activism, even the costs
of voting. Costs have been customarily greater in the foreign
context than those in the United States market, which investors often reduce through operational efficiencies." Whether
is a legal obligation to exercise voting rights on such securities, where the costs
do not outweigh the potential benefits. See Howard D. Sherman, Global Proxy
Voting: Regulatory Requirements and Industry Solutions, INSIGHTS, Dec. 1992, at
24. Mr. Sherman also contends that fund managers should "seek ways to lower
the costs of voting in" markets where it is not currently economical to do so. For
a discussion of the general fiduciary duties applicable to mutual funds and public
pension funds, see BETrY L. KRIKORIAN, FIDUCIARY STANDARDS IN PENSION AND
TRUST FUND MANAGEMENT 345-46 (1989).
47. See, e.g., Buxbaum, supra note 5, at 22 n.80. The Department of Labor,
Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration recently issued an interpretive bulletin dealing specifically with voting of proxies by pension funds (private) subject to
its jurisdiction. Department of Labor Pension and Welfare Administration Interpretive Bulletin, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,860 (1994) [hereinafter Dep't of Labor Release]. It
stated that plan officials have the same fiduciary responsibility to vote proxies in
foreign companies as they do with respect to U.S. corporations: "[Ilt is the
Department's view that the same principles apply. Namely, plan fiduciaries have a
responsibility to vote proxies on issues that may affect the value of the [foreign]
shares in the plan's portfolio." Id. at 38,861. The Department recognized that, in
certain cases, the costs of complying with this requirement might outweigh the
benefits to the plan. See infra note 48.
48. In its recent interpretative release governing voting by private pension
plan fiduciaries, the Department of Labor specifically recognized that "the cost of
exercising a vote on a particular proxy proposal [in a foreign corporation] could
exceed. any benefit that the plan could expect to gain in voting on the proposal."
Dep't of Labor Release, supra note 47, at 38,861. Accordingly, the Department directed the plan fiduciary "to weigh the costs and benefits of voting on proxy proposals relating to foreign securities and make an informed decision with respect to
whether voting a given proxy proposal is prudent and solely in the interest of the
plan's participants and beneficiaries." Id. The fiduciary's decision "should take into
account the effect that the plan's vote, either by itself or together with other
votes, is expected to have on the value of the plan's investment and whether this
expected effect would outweigh the cost of voting." Id. In fact, a fiduciary should
consider "whether the difficulty and expense of voting its shares is reflected in
their market price" when it makes the initial investment decision. Id.
The above suggests that a plan fiduciary cannot refuse to exercise a foreign
proxy because the exercise is difficult or somewhat costly. Rather, the fiduciary
must weigh the corresponding benefits to the plan, benefits that could come not
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or not an investor made its investment in a non-United States
company through the United States securities market,49 the
institutional investor needs information from the company as
well as specific information about issues eligible for a shareholder vote. The provision of this information is often costly, as
are its translation and any explanation of its significance to
the investor. Even voting could generate significant costs because foreign proxy voting procedures could be complicated or
cumbersome. For example, proxy rules might require the presence of a shareholder representative or the "immobilization" of
shares for a certain period of time before the shareholder meeting.o The immobilization prevents an investor from making a

solely from the plan's voting, but its votes combined with those of similarly-minded shareholders. Moreover, if voting is difficult, the plan fiduciary should have
purchased the securities initially at a discount to reflect these costs. This language
should be read in conjunction with another part of the Release that specifically
urges funds to take an activist position:
An investment policy that contemplates activities intended to monitor or
influence the management of corporations in which the plan owns stock
is consistent with a fiduciary's obligations under ERISA where the responsible fiduciary concludes that there is a reasonable expectation that
such monitoring or communication with management, by the plan alone
or together with other shareholders, is likely to enhance the value of the
plan's investment in the corporation, after taking into account the costs
involved.
Id. at 38,864.
49. Foreign equity is often traded in the U.S. in the form of American or
Global Depositary Receipts ("ADRs"). ADRs evidence Depositary Shares that are
issued by a U.S. bank and that represent an interest in underlying foreign securities that are held in custody by the bank. The general purpose of the ADR structure is to provide U.S. investors with a share denominated in dollars, which facilitates U.S. trading and settlement and which allows certain U.S. institutions that
must hold dollar-denominated securities to invest in foreign shares. If the underlying issuer "sponsors" the program, the issuer generally agrees to provide English
information on corporate events and to facilitate voting by U.S. investors. The
ADR facility also provides for a currency exchange so that U.S. investors are paid
dividends in dollars. See generally Joseph Velli, American Depositary Receipts: An
Overview, 17 FORDHAAM INT'L L.J. S38 (1994). It is reported that U.S. institutional
investors feel that the existence of an ADR facility enhances the appeal of a foreign company. See U.S. Fund Managers Plan to Boost Foreign Investment, Press
Ass'n Newsfile, July 21, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File
(citing Broadgate Consultants Inc. 1993 global investments trend survey).
50. For example, French companies generally require the immobilization of
"bearer" shares for five days before a shareholders' meeting. Foreign investors will
usually hold their shares in bearer form because it is difficult to hold shares registered with the company. See SOcnflw NATIONALE ELF AQUITAINE, PROSPECTUS 37
(1994) [hereinafter ELF]; see also Sherman, supra note 46, at 26 (describing various impediments, including blocking of shares, to foreign proxy voting).
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profitable use of the shares during that period (e.g., by lending
the shares).5 '
Until recently, the costs of obtaining information about,
and of being able to vote shares of, foreign companies were
high enough to make it questionable whether voting and activism by United States institutional investors for foreign companies were economically feasible.52 In global markets, information about world-class and other public companies is now
readily available, and economists believe that major foreign
markets operate efficiently.53
Moreover, foreign proxy voting has become easier for institutional investors. As will be discussed below, numerous organizations exist that provide services ranging from advice on, to
complete handling of, voting, matters. Thus, structural problems no longer pose significant obstacles to United States institutional investors who wish to participate in foreign corporate
governance.
B. United States Institutional Investor Activism in Western
Europe
Economic and legal reasons thus suggest that United
States institutional investors should participate in the corporate governance of foreign companies in which they have invested. Available evidence, which comes from press reports and
conversations with interested parties, suggests that this phenomenon is in fact occurring, and is perhaps on the rise. In
fact, as global portfolios of United States institutional investors
grow, the real challenge in the corporate governance area is a
"global" one: to participate in, and to affect, corporate governance in foreign companies.54
51. Securities can be lent for profit, often for settlement purposes, on a shortterm basis. See EUROCLEAR OPERATIONS CENTRE, SUPPLEMENTARY TERMS AND CONDITIONS GOVERNING THE LENDING AND BORROWING OF SECURITIES THROUGH

EUROCLEAR (1991) (describing program of lending and borrowing of securities held
in the Euroclear System, located in Brussels, Belgium and operated by Morgan
Guaranty Trust Company of New York).
52. See Sherman, supra note 46, at 25 (pointing out how, until recently, it
was difficult to vote proxies); see also STEPHEN M. DAVIS, SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS
ABROAD: A HANDBOOK FOR THE GLOBAL INVESToR 3942 (1989).

53. See Baumol & Malkiel, supra note 25, at 26 ("Taken as a whole, then, the
evidence supports the conclusion that markets for the shares of non-U.S. companies appear to be as efficient as those for U.S. firms. Publicly available information seems to be incorporated quite rapidly into share prices in all markets.").
54. See Joseph Lufldn, International Proxy Voting and Corporate Governance,
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Activism by United States institutional investors has
evolved as, advised by legal and business school academics who
study corporate governance, the institutions have experimented with different tactics and relevant laws have changed.55
The activities range from opposition to specific board resolutions considered to affect adversely share value because they
entrench management, to attempts to structure the board or to
affect board composition," to the recently popular practice of
pressuring management and the board in informal discussions
and through the strategic use of the press."

INSIGHTS, Dec. 1991, at 26 (describing how "U.S. institutions must develop the
capability to plan and manage integrated governance initiatives to be undertaken
with regard to foreign countries and/or companies").
55. Legal academics and practitioners have made numerous suggestions about
institutional activism. To name a few, Professors Gilson and Kraakman recommend
that a professional class of outside directors be established so that institutional
investors in a particular company can together select a representative from this
class to monitor the company on their behalf. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note
1, at 883-92. Joseph Grundfest proposes that, when opposed to a management
position, institutional investors "just vote no" and publicize their opposition, producing a reputational harm to the company that would adversely affect company
management. See Grundfest, supra note 1, at 928. Jeffrey Gordon argues for the
resurrection of cumulative voting to ensure that institutional investors will be able
to elect a representative to the board. See Gordon, supra note 3, at 165-74. While
some of the recommended strategies have been tried, others have not yet found a
following. See Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate
Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187 (1991)
(proposal to elect board members for a five-year term where board members could
not be removed).
56. See Gordon, supra note 3, at 132-42 (discussing various strategies open to
institutional investors with respect to affecting the board, e.g., ensuring an appropriate board structure, attempting to place certain members on the board, having
a policy input).
57. A useful way of identifying particular strategies used, or board resolutions
favored, by institutional investors is to review issues of the Institutional Investor
Responsibility Center's Corporate Governance Bulletin. The Dep't of Labor Release,
sets forth some of the more popular methods and issues on the activist agenda:
Active monitoring and communication activities would generally concern
such issues as the independence and expertise of candidates for the
corporation's board of directors and assuring that the board has sufficient
information to carry out its responsibility to monitor management. Other
issues may include such matters as consideration of the appropriateness
of executive compensation, the corporation's policy regarding mergers and
acquisitions, the extent of debt financing and capitalization, the nature of
long-term business plans, the corporation's investment in training to
develop its work force, other workplace practices and financial and nonfinancial measures of corporate performance. Active monitoring and communication may be carried out through a variety of methods including by
means of correspondence and meetings with corporate management as
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The perspective of United States institutional shareholders
on Western European corporate governance is guided by their
United States activities and views of United States corporate
governance. United States institutional investors focus abroad
generally on the same issues that concern them in United
States corporations: management either attempts to insulate
itself from market discipline or privileges other purposes over
total shareholder return." For the same reasons explaining
their activism at home, pension funds are also the activist
leaders of United States institutidnal investors abroad.59 Given the number of Western European jurisdictions and the
relative unfamiliarity of United States investors with the complexities of these foreign settings," these United States insti-

well as by exercising the legal rights of a shareholder.
Dep't of Labor Release, supra note 47, at 38,861.
The effects of institutional activism have been adequately documented. See
Black, supra note 1, at 828. It is again difficult to pick up the daily financial
press without seeing a sign of institutional investor pressure on some company.
58. See, e.g., Martin Dickson, Ballot Box CrusadersRide to Foreign Wars: The
Rise of Global Activism Among U.S. Institutional Shareholders, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 3,
1993, at 21 ("U.S. institutional investors, having stirred up corporate America over
the past five years with demands for better run business and more accountable
management, are beginning to flex their muscles in other leading western economies."); Richard A. Melcher & Patrick Oster, Yankee-Style Activists Strike
Boardroom Terror Abroad, BUS. WK., Mar. 15, 1993, at 74 ("[The] shareholder
uprising is reaching across the globe. In Canada, Continental Europe, and Japan-where entrenched bank cliques, families, and governments hold sway over
managers-shareholders are trying to change the balance of power."); David Waller
& Martin Dickson, California Activism Arrives in Germany, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 10,
1992, at 20 (noting that non-German institutional investors have privately complained "that German companies are run more in the interests of management,
workforce and vested banking and insurance contracts."). U.S. institutional shareholders are particularly concerned with counteracting the power of "established"
European institutional investors that have control of companies or close links with
management: See Leslie Wayne, Exporting Shareholder Activism, N.Y. TIMES, July
16, 1993, at D1 ("The overriding issue is that we are gradually chipping away at
an old structure dominated by banks and other friendly investors that often have
supermajority shares .... Unequal voting rights have given these old institutions
the lion's share of the power and outside shareholders feel their interests are not
being served.'") (quoting Howard Sherman of Institutional Shareholder Services
Inc.).
59. Reports in the press show that public pension funds, rather than other
kinds of institutional investors, have been the most "activist" of the U.S. institutional investors abroad. See Wayne, supra note 58, at D1 (discussing activism of
Wisconsin Fund (public pension fund) and CalPERS in Western Europe). Professor
Coffee has explained why such institutional investors, rather than their counterparts, are prone to take activist positions. See Coffee, supra note 3, at 869.
60. At a recent conference on mutual funds and corporate governance, spon-
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tutions are more inclined in the short term to adopt "blanket"
or "generic" approaches to foreign corporate governance. For
example, they are likely to identify resolutions they oppose or
favor and to vote, or instruct their custodians to vote, in accordance with their policies.6
In their actions and statements abroad, United States
institutional investors show that they are aware that they are
on unfamiliar cultural and legal ground. This behavior supports Professor Coffee's observation that, in light of the large
number of United States institutional investors and their tendency to diversify their holdings, they are likely to be more
effective in corporate governance if they form broad-based
coalitions with other investors on certain issues.62 Accordingly, instead of challenging a company's board or management
themselves, these investors (even the public pension funds)
prefer to follow the lead of a local shareholder or shareholder
group and to limit public intervention to egregious governance
problems.6 3 One pension fund is reported to have said that it
sored by the Columbia Law School Institute on Institutional Investors, Robert
Pozen, General Counsel of the Fidelity Group of Mutual Funds, remarked that,
from his perspective, the corporate governance situation in Europe is complex, and
that fund managers were only gradually learning to understand European corporate governance. Robert Pozen, The Potential and the Problems, Remarks at Columbia University Institutional Investor Project Conference on Mutual Funds and
Corporate Governance (May 5, 1994). In a conversation with the author, Joseph
Lufkin of the Global Proxy Services Corporation explained that many pension fund
managers are completely unfamiliar with European corporate governance. Telephone Interview with Joseph Lufkin, Managing Director, Global Proxy Services
(Apr. 6, 1994) [hereinafter Lufkin Interview].
61. See Sherman, supra note 46, at 27 (discussing the importance for a fund
to develop "guidelines outlining general voting principles"). It is likely that, because institutions are on unfamiliar ground and because costs are potentially prohibitive, institutions are likely to take "generic" solutions to foreign problems or
issues. See Gordon, supra note 3, at 135-37 (discussing advantages and disadvantages of generic, versus firm specific, strategies). However, Joseph Lufldn of the
Global Proxy Services Corporation argues that institutional investors must move
beyond the resolution stage to develop "less visible" ways of having a more effective influence on foreign corporations and their national regulatory systems. See
Lufkin, supra note 54, at 23.
62. See Coffee, supra note 3, at 851.
63. See Resener, supra note 23, at 51 ("The idea is to identify nascent situations or to create situations in which we can encourage and support local investors with interests similar to ours.") (quoting Joseph Lufldn, managing director of
Global Proxy Services Corporation). However, Luflkin argues that U.S. institutional
shareholders must know when to act independently: "The most successful institutions will be those who know when to act American, when to act local, and when
to take a more cosmopolitan approach." See Lufkin, supra note 54, at 23.
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wants local parties to identify the important domestic market
issues and to come to it for support.' These local parties
could be organizations of small shareholders or domestic institutional investors.85 Because the number of institutional
shareholders (i.e., pension funds, mutual funds) has been small
in most Western European markets,68 United States institutions cannot always find comparable institutions with which to
join forces. However, U.K. institutional investors, particularly
U.K. pension funds, are active in relevant European markets
and thus are providing potential allies."
The strongest evidence of offshore activism by United
States institutional investors is the industry that has sprung
up to aid these investors to understand and to participate in
foreign corporate governance. This industry has basically
grown out of organizations that aid institutional investors on
United States corporate governance. 8 These organizations

64. Telephone Interview with Robin Meszoli, Editor, The Global Shareholder
(Apr. 4, 1994).
65. See Europe: Shareholders'Rights in Europe, ECONOMIST, July 3, 1993, at
72 (pointing out that shareholder activism, which is homegrown, is becoming more
pronounced in Europe and gathering support from large Anglo-American funds);
Sherman, supra note 46, at 25.
66. See Wymeersch, supra note 18, at 5-9 (discussing how institutional investors in European countries are often not truly independent, but are linked to financial groups or banks).
67. See Marlene G. Star, Shareholder Activism Picks Up in Europe, PENSIONS
& INVESTMENTS, June 8, 1992, at 43 (discussing renewed activism by U.K. institutional investors); see also Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV.
1997 (1994) (discussing U.K. institutional investors); Paul L. Davies, Institutional
Investors in the United Kingdom, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 18, at 69-96 (describing U.K institutional investors and their
corporate monitoring).
One recent French example typifies U.S. institutional shareholder involvement with local market allies. Pinault-Printemps ("PP"), a large French retailer,
purchased shares of a mail order company, La Redoute, and decided to effect a
merger in which PP shares would be offered to La Redoute shareholders, which
included the College Teachers Equity Fund ("CREF"). There was concern among
La Redoute's shareholders that PP was directly or indirectly manipulating the
price of PP and La Redoute shares before the merger ratio was determined so as
to affect adversely La Redoute shareholders. A French shareholder rights group
brought suit against PP for this manipulation and spurred investigation by the
French market authority, the Commission des Operations de Bourse. While not
joining in the suit, CREF publicly stated its support for the plaintiff. See Le
Redoute Holders Back Pinault-PrintempsMerger, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1994, at
A10; Shareholders Rights in France, ECONOMIST, Mar. 12, 1994, at 87.
68. For example, the Investor Responsibility Research Center ("IRRC"), which
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perform a number of tasks for the United States institutional
investor. Some, like the Investor Responsibility Resource Center, provide information on foreign corporate governance issues
through newsletters or an occasional book.6 9 They might also
perform studies of particular markets or market events. °
Other organizations offer services in addition to general reporting of foreign corporate governance issues. These firms, such
as Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. and the Global
Proxy Services Corporation, are best described as "global
proxy" organizations: they actively assist United States institutional shareholders in voting their proxies. This assistance can
include establishing with a particular investor voting guidelines on issues of corporate governance. It can extend further
to the organization's voting for the investor. This may involve
collaboration with the custodian bank holding the offshore
investments for the pension or investment fund so that, with
few exceptions, proxies are sent directly to the organization,
which votes them in accordance with the established guidelines. The organizations meet any foreign proxy voting requirements by having contacts with local parties in the relevant markets. In certain cases, an investor may authorize the
organization to communicate directly with companies on its
behalf or to accompany the investor in such contacts. 7'1 Global
custodian banks have also developed foreign proxy services for

(as will be discussed below) provides information on corporate governance abroad,

initially focused on U.S. shareholder activism. Its publication, The Global Shareholder, now supplements its U.S. focused publication, The Corporate Governance
Bulletin. So also the Issue Alert publication of the Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. ("ISS") recently began to include a section on foreign corporate governance
entitled "The Global Report."
69. As mentioned in note 68, supra, the IRRO publishes the Global Shareholder, which focuses on shareholder rights and corporate governance issues abroad, as
well as on matters dealing with proxy voting. The IRRC also publishes a number
of books, one of which deals directly with the issue of U.S. institutional investors
abroad. See DAVIS, supra note 52; see also INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(Joseph C.F. Lufkin & David Gallagher eds., 1990) (surveys of market practices in
different countries).
70. For example, several investors commissioned the IRRC to do a full study
of French privatization, with the help of Deminor, a consulting group based in
Belgium and Paris. Telephone Interview with Robin Meszoli, supra note 64.
71. The above description is based upon a conversation with Howard D.
Sherman, director of Global Proxy Services for the ISS (Mar. 22, 1994), the Lufkin
Interview, supra note 60, and the Telephone Interview with Robin Meszoli, supra
note 64.
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their clients.72
This industry has actively monitored Western European
privatizations and explained their significance to United States
institutional investors." In particular, the organizations highlighted the corporate governance practices of privatized companies and the important topic of continued government ownership and involvement in the management of such companies.74 How the global proxy firms aided United States institutional investors on the transformation of French corporate
governance in the recent privatization will be treated below.
IV. FRENCH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The previous two parts of this Article explored investments and activism by United States institutional shareholders abroad. The next two parts focus on the transformation of
French corporate governance through privatization, and the
place of United States institutional investors in the process. To
understand this transformation one must understand the existing system. Accordingly, this part will review significant aspects of French corporate governance in world-class companies.
This review recognizes that, like the United States system,
the French system proposes a solution to the corporate agency
problem. In France, as in the United States, someone must
monitor the managers. My account emphasizes the historical
and political factors that created the French solution and thus
gives a cultural, not solely economic, understanding of French
corporate governance.75 This part also identifies the pressures

72. Global custodian banks, such as State Street Bank, Chase Manhattan or
Morgan Guaranty, to name a few, would send the client translated information
about proxy voting and arrange with their subcustodian in the local market to
satisfy any local formalities with respect to voting. See Sherman, supra note 46, at
25. Even foreign clearance and settlement systems, either used as subcustodians
by global proxy firms or acting as direct custodians, are improving their proxy
services. See EUROCLEAR OPERATIONS CENTRE, No. 94-R-007, PROXY VOTING: EN-

HANCED MEETING NOTIFICATION AND VOTING PROCEDURES (1994) (describing proxy
voting services provided through the Euroclear system). I thank Margaret Conklin,

Vice President & Assistant Resident Counsel of the Euroclear Operations Centre
for providing me the above information.
73. See infra text accompanying notes 217-18.

74. See, e.g., Paul V. Dionne & Giorgio Bertinetti, Italians Begin Searching for
the Public Company, ISSUE ALERT, July-Aug. 1994, at 9 (discussing Italian privat-

ization).
75. A cultural account does not exclude a purely economic understanding of a

1995]

FRENCH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

that French market. reforms and European Union developments are placing on French corporate governance.
A. French CorporateGovernance
This Section highlights three features of French corporate
governance. First, it describes the central background feature:
French government ownership and control of many internationally competitive French corporations. Second, it reviews the
general ownership and management structure of the typical
French government-owned corporation. Finally, the Section
examines the position of minority shareholders in this corporation and French shareholder rights generally.
1. State Control of the Economy
An understanding of contemporary French corporate governance in the largest French companies requires an awareness of the recent role of the French government in the
nation's economy. This role raises political and cultural
isssues, as well as economic ones. It is often said that French
government involvement in the economy owes much to the
French tradition of colbertisme.7 6 Named after Jean-Baptiste
Colbert, who was, among other things, a finance minister to
Louis XIV, colbertisme, as practiced by its namesake, was
designed to ensure that France had a significant trade surplus.
Accordingly, through Colbert the French state founded national
industries, and encouraged private industries through invest-

corporate governance situation. In fact, a properly cultural description should encompass the economic understanding. However, it also attempts to identify
noneconomic forces or pressures that might hinder the realization of the most
economically reasonable solution. Among economists, there is also some debate
about what accounts for an economically satisfactory answer to a given problem
and whether an economic account must embrace historical factors that led to a
given situation. See Richard R. Nelson, Recent Evolutionary Theorizing About Economic Change (unpublished paper, on file with Columbia University School of Law,
Center for Law and Economic Studies) (discussing recent increase of evolutionary,
or historical, studies of economic phenomenon).
76. See Colin Gordon, The Business Culture in France, in BUSINESS CULTURES
IN EUROPE 58, 98 (Collin Randlesome et al. eds., 1990) ("Such a system [of government influence over large private companies] underlines the strength of colbertisme
in France, the idea of a strong, interventionist state which, particularly back in
the 1960s and 1970s, had to be researcher, investor and financier. It alone had
the necessary global vision.").
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ments, all to produce goods for export. In sum, colbertisme was
a policy of purposeful state action to create a national industry
that would be competitive internationally.7"
Colbertisme provides the background, but reaction to the
disaster of the Second World War offers a more immediate
explanation of the present French government control of large
French companies. The French perceived that economic and
political shortcomings in the pre-War years had resulted in a
lack of modernization of the French economy, which left
France incapable of preparing for and reacting to German
aggression. Historians explain that the pre-War period was
complex and that the blame for structural French economic
problems cannot easily be laid on particular shoulders. 8 However, throughout this period, the French government maintained a classic liberal economic perspective." The market
and capitalists, left to themselves, did not develop industries
and the technology that would have enabled the French better
to resist the German invasion. 0
That many capitalists had collaborated with the German
occupiers and had been hostile to pre-War efforts to respond to
French economic weakness did not help the cause of economic
liberalism in the post-War years. 1 Moreover, the powerful
77. See Jean-Baptiste Colbert, in LE PETIT ROBERT 2: DICTIONNAIRE UNIVERSEL
DES NoMs PROPRES ALPHABtTIQUE ET ANALOGIQUE (Alain Rey ed., 1993).
78. See ALAIN BELTRAN & PAScAL GRISET, L'CONOMIE FRANAISE 1914-1945,
at 6-25 (1994).
79. At times, the government attempted to develop certain economic sectors.
According to Beltran and Griset, French government intervention in the economy
occurred significantly during the First World War and began to develop during the
Occupation. See id. at 6-8, 24-25. However, a classical liberal approach prevented
the government from maintaining an active involvement in industry, particularly
during the pre-World War II years. See id. at 10-11. More importantly, the French
government had not rationally encouraged the development of new technologies,
particularly in radio-communications and aeronautics, which proved crucial in
World War II. See id. at 117-18.
80. Although the economic evidence is subject to different interpretations, it
shows that during this period French companies were smaller than those in other
developed countries and were controlled by families. Few developed the size to
produce the needed advanced technologies and to compete in the international
markets. See id. at 74-75; see also THEODORE ZELDIN, FRANCE 1848-1945: AMBITION & LOvE 63-76 (1979) (discussing French industrialists and their reputed family "closeness" and insularity).
81. See JEAN-FRANQOIS ECK, HISTOIRE DE LICONOMIE FRANQAISE DEPUIS 1945,
at 4 (1994) (explaining the postwar hostility to company owners and management
who "aprbs avoir sabord6 l'oeuvre du Front populaire, a soutenu le regime de
Vichy, voire particip6 A la collaboration.").
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Communist group in the French Resistance was generally
hostile to capitalism." In addition to the Left, there was a
general consensus that the French government needed to take
an active role in industry and the economy if French companies were to attain the critical size and develop the technolomarkets and to preserve
gies to compete in international
83
France's national sovereignty.
The French government's control of the economy and large
companies during the post-War years is only briefly summarized here. It initially took the form of closing the French economy to outside influences and emphasizing growth based upon
reconstruction from the war and infrastructure modernization.' As a central part of its economic direction, the government established economic "plans." Although developed originally as a way to assure the United States that Marshall Plan
funds were being appropriately used, the plans had macroeconomic purposes of setting national economic goals and using
traditional means (subventions, government contracts, favorable tax breaks, etc.) to help achieve them." The government
had company management and worker representatives involved in the elaboration of the plans so that a social consensus could be reached concerning overall economic goals. Moreover, the French government used all its means to stimulate

82. See BELTRAN & GRISET, supra note 78, at 25 (pointing to the existence of
radical elements in the French Resistance who preferred a "break" with capitalism).
83. See id. at 178 ("Des formes de rejet du capitalisme se conjugaient avec la
demande d'un ttat puissant capable d'une politique 6conomique volontariste.
L'industrie frangaise devait 8tre concentrde, les structures rajeunies. La
planification, le dirigisme, les nationalisations apparaissaient A une majorit6 de
Frangais comme des mesures d'urgence qui ne se discutaient gu~re. L'4conomie
mixte-avec un ttat omniprdsent-semblait la meilleure solution."). Beltran and
Griset observe that a significant group that favored this union between the State
and industry were engineers and other highly educated company management who
understood the importance of technology and the need for companies of critical
size to develop it. See id. at 84, 118-19; see also RICHARD F. KUISEL, CAPITALISM
AND THE STATE IN MODERN FRANCE: RENOVATION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 203-07 (1981).
84. See ECK, supra note 81, at 7 ("Enfin, la fermeture face au reste du monde
permet une profonde intervention de l'Etat. La comptitivit6 des entreprises,
prot6gdes de la concurrence 6trang~re et peu tourndes vers l'exportation, n'est pas
l'objectif majeur de la politique dconomique.").
85. See id. at 12-13 (explaining that French plans involved some forecasting
and goal-setting and differed from those of a socialist economy that completely
determined economic development).
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economic growth and to improve the economic well-being of its
citizens.8 6
A key feature of the French government's post-War involvement in economic affairs was the growth of the public
sector. Before World War II, the French government owned a
few large enterprises that provided public services (e.g., the
Post Office and telephones), a few specialized financial institutions and companies in sensitive defense sectors (e.g., airlines,
train and marine transport)." The immediate post-War years
saw significant nationalizations, some designed to punish collaborator owners. Other nationalizations were effected to enable the government to control reconstruction and remedy the
pre-War failings of industry and finance. Accordingly, the government nationalized certain basic industries, such as gas and
electricity, and large banks and insurance companies to enable
the government to use their resources for modernization.88
The new government-owned enterprises undertook projects, or
entered technical areas, that private industry was reluctant to
pursue. Its companies thus often acted as a competitive stimulus to private industry. 9 This government involvement was a
success: France experienced approximately thirty years of
growth and prosperity popularly known as "Les Trente
Glorieuses." 0
The French government's involvement in the economy
gradually evolved from its near absolute dominance in the
post-war years. It allowed the markets to resume their control
and opened French commerce to world trade, although the
plan structure remained in place. With the opening of French
companies to market competition, particularly world market

86. See id. at 14-17 (pointing out that the French government stimulated
consumption by providing its citizens with a social security system that protected
them from the typical life risks, i.e., sickness, old age, disability and maternity; it
financed investments through its control of funds placed in state-controlled savings
and financial institutions).
87. See id. at 13.
88. See id.
89. See id at 13-14. Eck cites nuclear energy, as well as continued exploration for sources of traditional energy, as examples of the achievement of French
state-owned companies. He observes that, in auto manufacturing, the government
forced Renault to produce something that it had on its drawing board for years,
but that it had neglected to pursue: an inexpensive popular car.
90. See id. at 8. The thirty years of success were brought to an end by the
oil crises of the 1970s.

1995]

FRENCH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

competition, the nature of government direction of enterprises
changed. The government encouraged most state-owned enterprises to compete internationally and promoted "national leaders" in industries to compete effectively beyond French borders.9 Thus, direct and indirect state influence over French
companies remained an accepted part of French economic life.
It was thus not surprising that in 1981, when the Socialists
came to power in the middle of an economic crisis, they turned
to further nationalizations.92
2. Ownership Structure and Management
Because of nationalizations after World War II and in
1982, the French government controlled a major portion of the
French economy. 93 Its ownership of companies took several
forms, such as the integration of a company within a public
department, or the direct, or indirect, ownership of controlling
shares of a private company.94

91. See id. at 32-34.
92. See id. at 49-52 (observing that the nationalizations of 1981-1982 had
primarily economic purposes: to include major industrial companies within a coherent industrial strategy and to compel nationalized banks to support the credit
needs of small and medium-sized French companies).
93. In his book on French privatizations, Michel Durupty provides statistics
concerning the French government's involvement in the economy before the 1986
privatizations. MICHAEL DuRUPTY, LES PRIVATISATIONS EN FRANCE (1988). For example, in 1985 French companies falling into the "secteur public" encompassed
approximately 25% of all industrial workers, 35% of fixed capital (excluding financial and agricultural enterprises) and 20% of value added (excluding financial and
agricultural enterprises). See id. at 9-17; see also ECK, supra note 81, at 51 (presenting statistics of French involvement in industry in 1980, 1985 and 1990, which
establish, for example, that in 1990 the public sector accounted for 23% of exports); Gordon, supra note 76, at 62. One has only to consider the list of some of
the nationalized companies to get a sense of the government ownership of the
French economy. Leaving aside the pre-War state-owned or controlled companies
such as the PTT (Postes et T6l6communications), the SNCF (Soci6t6 Nationale de
Chemins de Fer Franqais, or the railroads), Air France, and national credit establishments, in the immediate post-War years nationalization included Renault,
SNECMA (specializing in airplane motors), EDF (tlectricit6 de France) and GDF
(Gaz de France), the Banque de France, Crddit Lyonnais, Socidt6 Generale, Banque
Nationale de Paris (all banks) and numerous insurance companies. In 1982 nationalization reached 12 industrial companies, two financial conglomerates and 36
banks, two airplane companies and various electrical or communications companies.
See ECK, supra note 81, at 52 (French government controls "outre l'6nergie et les
transports, la distribution du crddit et une part importante de l'industrie, en
particulier dans les secteurs de base").
94. Companies within the French public sector are thus an "6tablissement
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The French government has addressed the classical 6orporate agency problem in the private companies that it owns in
several ways. First, French law requires that, in such situations, representatives of the French government sit on the
French equivalent of the board of directors."5 Given the typical board composition,96 and the State's ownership percentage
in these companies, the French government controls the board.
Second, the government appoints (and fires) the chief executive
officers of the state-owned companies. 7 Third, the government can exert numerous "contr6les" on the company, i.e.,
through inspections, the placing of a government representative in the company, and the examination of a company's accounts.9"
However, complete domination of French companies by
their state owner has not been the rule. The evolution of the
French state sector in the post-War years explains this relative
lack of domination. After World War II and again after the
Socialists took power, the French government exerted significant control over its companies, using them to serve political

public industriel et commercial" or a private company with share capital (the
"socijtj anonyme"). See JEAN KERNINON, LES CADRES JURIDIQUES DE L'CONOMIE
MIXTE 56 (1992). The former is a category within French administrative law, while
the latter is simply a private company some or all of whose shares are held, directly or indirectly, by the French government. See id. at 72. A private company
generally falls within the French public sector if the majority of its capital is held
by the French State, although certain legal interpretations would place within the
public sector those companies "controlled" by the state, i.e., where the State can
control management. See id. at 73. Given that, until recent privatizations, many
major French credit organizations, banks and insurance companies were all owned
by the French government, the French government ownership of private companies
was often made through such institutions. See Gordon, supra note 76, at 80 (discussing French bank and insurance ownership of industrial companies and that
many of these banks and insurance companies are government controlled).
95. See KERNINON, supra note 94, at 78. French private companies with share
capital have two'kinds of structures: a board of directors (conseil d'administration)
supervising management or a surveillance board (conseil de surveillance) sitting
above a management board (directoire). The latter structure, which is not widely
used, limits the surveillance board's duties to selecting the members of the
directoire and to reviewing the board's actions. See MICHEL JEANTIN, DROIT DES
SOCI TS 275 (2d ed. 1992).
96. Under French law, the board of a company within the public sector generally consists of three groups: government representatives; representatives of consumers (also selected by the government); and labor representatives. See
KERNINON, supra note 94, at 78.
97. See id., at 79-80.
98. See id., at 81-89.
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and economic purposes, such as reconstruction and unemployment. These periods typified a form of relational investing
where an enterprise would serve purposes other than the central capitalist purpose of maximizing profits for an owner.99
Because of political and economic pressures, the French
state has gradually given a significant entrepreneurial independence to public sector companies. Aside from certain leftist
groups, French politicians have rejected anticapitalist purposes
for French state-owned companies." 0 Moreover, many of the
state-owned French companies are competing in European and
world markets. Thus, if the companies do not succeed in such
markets, they can impose, and have imposed, significant financial burdens on the French state. 1 ' Indeed, the latter day
colbertist position of creating national leaders in industry
among the state-owned companies is evidence of the
government's recognition of the importance of market competition.10 2 For many public sector companies, therefore, the overall goals have become productivity and competitiveness, not
particular state social purposes.0 3
Accordingly, the French government has increasingly left
much discretion to management for the operation, as well as

99. This form of control demonstrates what Professor Rock terms the "dark
side" of relational investing. The relational owner does not so much improve total
shareholder return, but gains direct or indirect payoffs or sales. For example, if a
bank owned an industrial company, the bank could be expected to receive most of
the lending work generated by that company. See Rock, supra note 4, at 1002-03.
When the state is the major relational investor of a company operating in the
competitive markets, the State may derive benefits that have nothing to do with
profit-maximizing, but may have much to do with helping society in general (as in
the case of reconstruction) or politically strong groups (e.g., workers, when a company is used to increased employment).
100. The evolution of the board structure of such companies reveals the lessening of importance of anticapitalist purposes championed by the Left. Board representation was to include workers, consumers and government with the idea that
public sector companies would work for the good of the country as a whole. In
fact, the government has generally controlled these boards so that companies serve
specific state economic, not necessarily national, purposes. When, as discussed
below, the state promotes the competitive position of companies in world markets,
the direct social purpose of these companies becomes more tenuous. See KERNINON,
supra note 94, at 75-77.
101. See id. at 39-42 (discussing the difficulty the French State has to balance
its budget while supporting state-owned companies with the necessary funds for
their operation and development).
102. See id. at 34-36.
103. See id. at 89.
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the overall direction, of state-owned companies. The French
government acts in ways that United States proponents of
relational investing would like to see characterize United
States institutional investors. French government representatives and company management establish together something
akin to a "plan" on a company level.' °4 This plan sets an
overall strategy for the company and middle-term goals for it
to achieve. Generally, if the goals are met, the state leaves
management alone. Only when the company is in trouble is the
French state likely to exert the considerable power at its disposal to interfere with company affairs." 5
Not only does the French government's relational investing
address the corporate agency problem in state-owned companies, but the background and formation of company executives
create a continuity of interests between the state-owner and
managers. Executives in French state-owned companies have
traditionally come, not from the ranks of entrepreneurs or from
a progression up the career ladder inside the company, but
from a small select group. 6 This group consists of individuals trained in elite schools of public administration or commercial affairs, such as the Ecole Nationale d'Administration and
Hautes Ettudes Commerciales.' 7 The managers have nearly
all worked in a ministry or a branch of public administration
08
before assuming a high executive position in a company.

104. See id. at 90.

105. See id. at 91-92. This model of State relational investing resembles other
main French corporate governance situations, Another prominent ownership structure in France is family control of corporations. See Wymeersch, supra note 18, at
9-10 ("Correspondingly, in Belgium, the Netherlands, and France one predominantly finds companies that, although listed on the stock exchange, are closely held
and often minority controlled, whether by the founding family, by financial holdings, or by other interests acting together. Ownership and control can often be
traced back to an identifiable person or group of persons."). In this family or
"close corporation" structure, management is often given free reign to pursue strategies with periodic review by family owners.
106. See OXFORD ANALYTICA LTD., BOARD DIRECTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: TRENDS IN THE G7 COUNTRIES OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS 96 (1992) (discussing how French state-owned companies have almost uniformly preferred high
ranking career civil servants for executives at the expense of entrepreneurs or
company insiders); see also MICHEL BAUER, LES 200: COMMENT DEVIENT-ON UN
GRAND PATRON? (1987).
107. See ECK, supra note 81, at 29; KERNINON, supra note 94, at 80.
108. See KERNINON, supra note 94, at 80 ("La position des dirigeants est
d'autant plus solide qu'ils satisfont A certains critbres de l6gitimit6, tels que
l'appartenance A un grand corps de l'Etat, une exp6rience acquise au sein de cabi-
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They are thus likely to share the views of government officials,
generally their former colleagues, and to accept the current
view of French government intervention in, or regulation of,
the economy. In economic parlance, the government-owner has
already made "bonding" expenditures to ensure that its manager-agents will act in accordance with its interests.0 9
3. Non-Controlling Shareholders
As a final feature of this review of French corporate governance in state-owned, globally competitive companies, it is
useful to consider the position of shareholders, who are often
natural persons with no state affiliation or state purpose behind their investment (e.g., are not also state-owned or controlled)."0 That nationalized companies have private shareholders may seem something of a contradiction. These shareholders were occasionally a holdover from prenationalization
days or, at times, arose from a policy of opening the capital of

nets ministdriels ou A la tte d'une direction d'administration centrale, des
responsabilitds ddj& assum6es au sein de grandes entreprises publiques ou
privdes.").
109. In some cases, however, executives of French government-owned companies
have shown considerable independence from the state with respect to business
strategy and other matters. This independence does not necessarily contradict the
unity of interests between the government and company management. If, as explained above, the government wants its companies to be able to compete in international markets, it must give a certain freedom to managers. It is likely that
managers, who are judged on the competitive success of their company, will pursue this success and resist government interference that detracts from it. See
KERNINON, supra note 94, at 80 ("Cette dmancipation des dirigeants n'est pas
fortuite. Elle se trouve li~e A la vocation capitaliste assignde aux entreprises
publiques, et tout spdcialement aux entreprises industrielles ou de services du
secteur concurrentiel.").
French executives are also generally acknowledged to be highly motivated
and concerned about their reputation in the relatively small circle of elite civil
servants and company managers. This concern helps to counter self-interested
behavior on their part. However, there have recently been scandals in management
of French world-class companies, including those that are state-owned, which involve mismanagement or personal management corruption. These scandals call
somewhat into question the success of the state's relational investing. See, e.g.,
Alice Rawsthorn, Last Chapter in a Stormy Career: Jean-Yves Haberer is Unlikely
to Go Quietly, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1994, at 18 (discussing mismanagement at the
state-owned Crddit Lyonnais by Jean-Yves Haberer, who, after being relieved of
his duties as PDG (prdsidentdirecteur general) at Crddit Lyonnais, was made PDG
of another state-owned bank, Crddit National (from which position he has since
been removed)).
110. See infra note 111.
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these companies to the capital markets, thus relieving the
state of complete responsibility for their financing.'
The weak position of the small shareholder is the natural
counterpart to the dominance of company management. By all
accounts, French company management, particularly the chief
executive officer (in French, the pr6sident directeur general
(PDG)) completely controls a corporation and regards it as his
own domain."' A PDG does not place the interests of
noncontrolling shareholders above his own strategic plans, and,
he may even be relatively independent of the state. Perhaps
this lack of attention to small shareholder interests has naturally arisen in a market of small capitalization, where investors with other than controlling stakes have been neither significant nor numerous.' Moreover, small shareholders have
traditionally had limited interests (i.e., steady receipt of dividends with little concern about control), and thus have not
pushed for a corporate governance role."'

111. See KERNINON, supra note 94, at 39-42 (discussing the opening of stateowned companies to private capital, particularly in the form of "special" instruments, such as titres participatifs and certificats d'investissement, which generally
do not give the holders any voting rights). Because the position of the "small"
shareholder in a state-owned company is not so different from that in a company
completely owned by nongovernment shareholders, the following remarks could
equally apply to French corporate governance in all large French companies.
112. See OXFORD ANALYTICA, supra note 106, at 118 (discussing the dominance
that French management typically has in a company, even over the board of directors); Gordon, supra note 76, at 99-100 ("This power [concentration] is reinforced
by the role of the boards and their chairmen. General meetings of shareholders
have virtually no teeth and the board is only formally answerable to its shareholders. In their turn, members of the board are only there to back up the chairman
(le president). The system is almost a carbon copy of the French parliamentary
system, with extensive powers vested in the state President. Some have called it
management by divine right with chairmen not answerable to anyone-votes are
rare and, indeed, if a proposal is put to the vote, it is seen virtually as a sign of
no confidence in the chairman and time for him to resign.").
113. Commentators acknowledge the continuing decline in the number of individual shareholders in the French market. Cf ALICE PEZARD, DROIT DES MARCHtS
MONtTAIRE ET BOURSIER 260 (1994) (noting the decline in small shareholders since
1987). The number of small shareholders in France may be increased by the recent privatizations. But see Michel Bauer, The Politics of State.Directed
Privatisation:The Case of France, 1986-88, in THE POLITICS OF PRIVATIZATION IN
WESTERN EUROPE, supra note 34, at 58 (observing that many small shareholders
who had purchased shares in the privatizations beginning in 1986 quickly resold
their shares).
114. Some French market authorities believe that small shareholders in France
have traditionally viewed equity almost as they view bonds, i.e., as an instrument
paying a steady return, and have not been concerned about issues of control or
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Certain features of French corporate governance emphasize the powerlessness of small shareholders. They cannot
count on the board of directors because board members represent controlling shareholders and are otherwise dominated by
management." 5 Moreover, even if board members are "outside" directors in United States parlance, no strong legal duties
compel them to protect all the corporation's shareholders and
to avoid conflicts of interest."' One sign of this lack of concern about these shareholders by directors and management is
the infrequent recourse to directors' and officers' insurance."'

even capital appreciation. Interview with Mr. Francois Champarnaud, Chef du
Service des Etudes et du D~veloppement du March6, Commission des Operations
de Bourse, in Paris, France (July 1, 1994).
115. Independent directors do exist in French companies, but a board is usually
composed of directors selected by management or represents controlling shareholders. See INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, INC., PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES:
FRANCE 10 (1993).
116. Cf. Arnaud Leparmentier, Bourse: Les Petits ont toujours tort, LE NOUVEL
ECONOMISTE, June 10, 1994, at 63 ("'En France, aucune disposition l6gale ne peut
priver certains administrateurs de leurs voix d6lib6ratives en raison d'6ventuels
conflits d'int6rts.'") (quoting Jean-Claude Sarazin, PDG of La Redoute). In addition to an obligation not to violate the law or to cause the company to act in an
ultra vires manner, a member of the board of directors of a French company has a
weak duty of 'due care." As explained by Professor Jeantin:
Les dirigeants sont responsables, envers les soci~tes et envers les tiers de
toute infraction aux lois et r~glements applicables aux socidt6s, de toute
violation des statuts ainsi que de toute faute de gestion. La loi ne d~finit
nullement la faute de gestion; il s'agira soit d'un acte contraire a l'int6rAt
social, soit d'un acte excdent l'objet social, soit encore d'une d6cision
dont les cons6quences se sont r6v~l~es malencontreuses pour la societ6.
JEANTIN, supra note 95, at 140; see also ROMANO, supra note 14, at 134-35 (describing how duty of loyalty is not well developed in France and that there is also
no corporate opportunity doctrine) (referring to Andr6 Tunc, Corporate Law, in
EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON INTEGRATION AND
HARMONIZATION, supra note 5, at 199, 211-12).
117. Although increasingly prevalent in France, as well as in the rest of Europe, this kind of insurance has generally been used to protect directors from a
legal liability to cover the debts of a bankrupt company that was brought to insolvency by the director's wrongdoing. See Rachid Safa, Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance and the Theory of Abuse of Corporate Assets Under French Law, 21
IN 'L BUS. LAW. 365 (1993). For a discussion of this liability, see JEANTIN, supra
note 95, at 140-41. Market professionals predict that suits for general director
negligence outside the insolvent company situation will likely increase. See
Leparmentier, supra note 116, at 63 ("D'ici A cinq ans, on va assister aux premiers proc~s contre des administrateurs d6ficients.") (quoting Alain Minc, former
director and PDG).
Moreover, a shareholder in large non-state-owned companies will generally
find that the company has significant antitakeover protection, whether through
French law or by way of the company's charter. French law requires disclosure to

40

BROOK. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XXI:I

Just as most commentators of French corporate governance agree that French company management has significant
power, often at the expense of noncontrolling shareholders,
many believe that the situation is changing, albeit gradually.
In recent years, organizations of small shareholders have
sprung up that are challenging in the courts management's
decisions or other corporate actions having adverse effects on
them."8 Moreover, organizations also exist to aid shareholders that have significant minority stakes in companies." 9 As
discussed above, these organizations often increase their power
by forming alliances with non-French institutional shareholders. This small shareholder "activism" is one of several phenomena that may lead to change in French corporate governance.

the company and, in certain cases, market authorities by purchasers (or parties
acting in concert) of acquisitions of listed shares at various thresholds: 5%, 10%,
20%, 33 1/3%, 50%, 66 2/3%. Penalties for failure to disclose such acquisitions
include loss of voting rights on the shares in excess of the thresholds for a minimum of two years. See Keith D. Nunes et al., French & SEC Securities Regulation: The Search for Transparency and Openness in Decisionmaking, 26 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L. L. 217, 242 (1993). Company charters can reduce the threshold to
1/2%. See Yves Guyon, Les Investissuers Institutionnels en Droit Francais,in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 385, 391 (Theodor Baums et al.
eds., 1994). French public companies have also been known to limit the number of
votes that any one shareholder can cast. See ALCATEL ALSTHOM, PROSPECTUS 55
(1992) (describing limitation of votes of any shareholder to 8%).
118. These organizations include "Anaf" (l'Association nationale des actionnaires
de France) and "Adam" ("lAssociation de defense des actionnaires minoritaires"), the
latter operated by Colette Neuville. Most recently, Adam was active in challenging
the merger terms in the Pinault acquisition of La Redoute. See Guyon, supra note
117, at 387 (discussing how the goals of institutional shareholders and smaller
shareholders may be different); Leparmentier, supra note 116, at 61.
119. Such organizations represent (for a fee) shareholders that, while having a
minority position, have a significant enough position to make it economically reasonable to contest actions that harm their economic interest. In France, a good
example of such an organization is D6minor, also known as the Socijtg de d6fense
des actionnaires minoritaires. The "objectif' of D~minor is as follows: "d'assister
etlou de representer l'actionnaire minoritaire d'une soci6t6, depuis sa prise de
participation jusqu'b la cession 6ventuelle de celle-ci, en passant par la d~fense de
ses int6r~ts pendant la d~tention de cette participation." See DMINOR, SOCIIfTt DE
DtFENSE DES ACTIONNAIRES MINORITAIRES (bulletin describing organization).
D6minor is reported to have had significant success in several cases, including a
takeover of the Wagon-Lits company by Accor. Interview with Marie-Sophie H6lias,
Associde, D~minor, in Paris, France (June 16, 1994). Ms. H6lias has just founded
another company in Paris, Franklin Global Investor Services, with a similar purpose. Id.
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B. CapitalMarket Pressures
The preceding section outlined major features of French
corporate governance in the large, state-owned companies and
also suggested that the system is under pressure to change.
This section explores other related pressures on French corporate governance that push in directions potentially incompatible with the present system. They are (i) French capital market developments and (ii) developments in the European Union
(EU), of which France is a member.
1. French Capital Market Developments
The French capital market is a relatively small one.12
This size is understandable because most corporate financing
has come from the state, state-owned or -controlled financial
institutions or large, often family-owned industrial groups.
Because the French government has encouraged state-owned
companies to turn more to the capital markets for financing,
the capitalization of the French market should increase in size
as more shares are listed on it. 2 ' However, development of
the French capital market and its increased capitalization also
depend upon creation of an efficient, low-cost, and honest market, which will be attractive to investors, given that investors,
whether domestic or foreign, have investment alternatives.
In recent years, French government, market, and business
authorities have all made concerted efforts to improve the
depth, liquidity, and quality of the French capital market so
that Paris would become an important European financial

120. In terms of market capitalization, the Paris stock market, or Bourse,

ranks fifth behind stock exchanges in New York, Tokyo, London and Germany. In
addition, Paris ranks below the above as well as below markets in Korea, Switzerland and Taiwan in volume of transactions. See COMMISSION DES OPtRATIONS DE
BOURSE, 26E RAPPORT AU PISIDENT DE LA RgPUBLIQUE, ANNEXES 43-44 (1993)

[hereinafter COB]. See also Joel Seligman, Another Unspecial Study: The SEC's
Market 2000 Report and Competitive Developments in the United States Capital
Markets, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 32, at 1, 17 n.43 (1994) (presenting statistics based upon DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION OF THE SEC, MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQUITY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS (1994)).

121. Market capitalization has in fact significantly increased from 1992 to 1993
(by approximately 40%), after a slight decline from 1991 to 1992. The amount of
market transactions similarly increased during the same period. However, the
number of companies listed on the Paris exchanges has steadily declined for this
period. See COB, supra note 120, at 36.
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center to rival London's dominance. 122 These efforts have resulted in a complete overhaul and modernization of France's
securities markets. The seven separate French stock exchanges
(Paris and six regional centers) have all been placed into a
national market system, with most activity taking place on the
Paris Bourse. Developments include a computerized trading
facility for the routing and execution of orders, a similarly
computerized settlement facility and a depositary system using
entirely dematerialized securities (i.e., securities are represented no longer by certificates but by accounts in a central account mechanism.)123
French authorities have also improved the quality of the

122. See Gordon, supra note 76, at 86 (describing the aim among French authorities to "attract back" to France securities business that "leaked" to London).
The main competitor to the French capital market is the London Stock Exchange
(known as the International Stock Exchange of England and the Republic of Ireland), particularly with its SEAQ international system, an automated system
where market makers provide quotations in stock of non-U.K. companies. Traditionally, this system has attracted trading of stock of major French companies
because of liquidity problems on the Paris Bourse. See NORMAN S. POSER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION: LONDON'S "BIG BANG" AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS 379-83 (1991 & Supps. 1991, 1992). With a more developed

market comes potential growth in the French securities industry. French market
participants, such as banks, securities brokers, and clearance systems, develop
expertise, become more sophisticated and are better equipped to compete in the
global securities markets.
123. The reforms of the French capital markets (known as the "Little Bang",
after the "Big Bang" reference to the transformation of the London markets) is
described in detail in POSER, supra note 122, at 379-92, 92-103 (Supp. 1991), 10215 (Supp. 1992); see also Leslie Goldman, The Modernization of the French Securities Markets: Making the EEC Connection, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S227 (1992). For a
description of (i) how a price for a given stock is established on the Bourse, (ii)
how orders are fed for execution into the computerized quotation system (i.e., the
C.A.C. or "cotation assistge en continu") and (iii) how the orders are settled
through the Relit (rglement-livraisondes titres en France) system, see GROUP OF
THIRTY, CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT PROJECT: FRANCE, YEAR-END 1990 STATUS

REPORT (1990) (description of Relit system); PEZARD, supra note 113, at 120-30;
POSER, supra note 122, at 105-06, 109 (Supp. 1992). The central "depositary" of
French shares, SICOVAM (the "Socidt6 Interprofessionnelle pour la Compensation
des Valeurs Mobili~res"), maintains accounts for companies or for accredited parties (i.e., banks or brokers), to which securities are credited. Shareholders indirectly hold their securities through these accounts. See Richard Vilanova, Clearing and
Settlement in France (1991) (unpublished paper submitted to the International Bar
Association Conference in Hong Kong 1991; on file with author) (describing legal
background to dematerialization); Martin Gdanski, Dematerialization of Securities
in France (May 17, 1991) (unpublished paper submitted to the International Bar
Association Eighth Annual Seminar on International Financial Law; on file with
author).
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major market participants, the French brokers. These market
participants are particularly important for increasing the liquidity of the market, a characteristic of chief importance to
investors.'2 4 They provide this liquidity by purchasing securities for their own account as dealers at a time when a market
cannot absorb all the trading volume, thus creating an orderly
market. Traditionally, French brokers (known as agents de
change) could not deal in securities and thus could only match
buy and sell orders.'2 5 Moreover, they were a closed fraternity whose members did not include foreigners. Reforms of the
Bourse beginning in 1987 changed this situation: the brokers
became incorporated member firms (socidtds de bourse) that
could act as dealers and do other services. In addition, they
could be 100% foreign-owned. This reform resulted in the acquisition of French brokers by large French banks, as well as
by foreign banks and investment firms. In addition, it added
capital to brokers and thus liquidity to the Bourse. 2 '
A market subject to significant abuses, such as insider
trading or market manipulation, is unlikely to attract investors
that have many other investment possibilities around the
globe.12 In recent years, the French government and French
market authorities have significantly improved the integrity of
the French financial markets. Much of this effort has been
devoted to enhancing the status and powers of the Commission
des Op6rations de Bourse (COB), a government agency responsible for regulating the French markets. 2 ' Because of chang-

124. See PEZARD, supra note 113, at 117 (L'investisseur sur le march6
secondaire des actions peut facilement et rapidement r~cup~rer ses fonds investis
puisqu'il peut A tout moment vendre ses titres sous r6serve des plus ou moinsvalues r~alises depuis l'investissement.").
125. See POSER, supra note 122, at 381-83.
126. See id. at 383-84 (describing the transformation of the agents de change);
see also PEZARD, supra note 113, at 201-16.
127. See Richard C. Breedon, The Globalization of Law and Business in the
1990s, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509, 515 (1993) ("The integrity of the market is
one of the United States' most important competitive advantages. Some maintain a
nation maximizes its competitiveness by the elimination of regulation. While I
agree that many regulations inhibit rather than strengthen the market, few investors of any nationality wish to invest their hard-earned savings only to have them
promptly stolen.").
128. See PEZARD, supra note 113, at 427-47; POSER, supra note 122, at 386-88.
In addition to the COB, there is the Conseil des Bourses de Valeurs (the "CBV"),
which is a self-regulatory organization of stock exchange firms, and the Soci~t6 des
Bourses Franqaises (the "SBF"), which is a self-regulatory organization for the
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es in French financial laws, the COB has received greater
powers, particularly in the area of investigating and penalizing
market abuses.129 As a result, it resembles the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission, with which it has a
Memorandum of Understanding.!"0 The COB can address insider trading abuses by subjecting defendants to significant
civil liabilities, in addition to criminal liabilities." 1 Moreover,
French takeover laws have been continually amended to improve the situation of noncontrolling investors.132
Although reforms to the French capital markets increase
their size, liquidity, and quality, such reforms may prove incompatible with a corporate governance system of state, or
state-controlled financial institution financing, and of a small,
closed market favoring controlling interests. 33 As stateowned companies turn to capital market financing (with an
ultimate goal of complete privatization), the role of state financing, or financing through state financial institutions, diminishes. Capital market investors, generally focused on total
investment return and hostile to noneconomic purposes,134

stock markets.
129. See POSER, supra note 122, at 110-12 (Supp. 1992); COB, supra note 120,
at 181-211.
130. See Understanding with France, International Series, Release No. 116
(Jan. 12, 1991), available in LEXIS, FEDSEC Library, SECREL File. Generally,
this memorandum provides that each agency will supply the other with information in its possession to counteract market abuses in each jurisdiction.
131. See POSER, supra note 122, at 111 (Supp. 1992). On the development of
French insider trading laws, see Robert B. Irving, French Insider Trading Law: A
Survey, 22 INTER-AM. L. REV. 41 (1990); Carol Umhoefer & Alain Pietrancosta, Le
Ddlit d'Initid: Insider Trading Law in France, 30 COLUMI. J. TRANSNATL L. 89
(1992).
132. Thus, if a buyer purchases one-third of the shares of a listed company, it
must make an offer for the remaining two-thirds of the shares. See PEZARD, supra
note 113, at 321 (noting that this law conforms with the European Union's proposed Thirteenth Directive on Takeovers). On this Directive, see Roberta S.
Karmel, Securities Law in the European Community: Harmony or Cacophany?, 1
TuL. J. INT'L COMP. L. 3, 18 (1993).
133. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
134. See Franqois Morin, La Privatisationde la BNP et la formation d'un nouveau p6le financier, 28 REV. ECON. FIN. 121, 127 (1994) ("Le modale du march6
financier est un systme dans lequel I'Atat n'intervient que faiblement; celui-ci
rbgle cependant, par la r~glementation, son fonctionnement global. Dans un tel
environnement, les grandes firmes ont des caract6ristiques bien particulibres. Elles
ont le plus souvent un actionnariat dispers6, et le but des actionnaires st de
valoriser au mieux leurs placements, ce qui en g~n~ral les oppose aux dirigeants,
qui eux sont rarement titulaires de faon significative de titres de la firme.").
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should rise in importance as the state's role recedes. Moreover,
capital market financing is arguably cheaper and more flexible
than state or state surrogate financing, which could improve
the competitive position of French companies using it." 5
Given the decline in the number of individual investors, a
transformation to full capital market financing would require
funds from domestic investors other than the state or its proxies. Such investors exist in the form of mutual funds" 6 and
incipient pension funds,"7 but do not by any means dominate
the French market. Existing French funds have so far been
quiet on corporate governance issues. However, to compete
135. The argument would go something as follows: Large French companies increasingly compete in global product markets. To be a viable global competitor a
company must be able to raise large amounts of capital as inexpensively and flexibly as possible. One of the most flexible, and often the cheapest, means of financing is in the capital markets, as opposed to specialized financing through financial
intermediaries. A company with access to the capital markets will have a competitive advantage over one that does not have such access. Moreover, a company may
particularly be in a favorable position if its local capital market is a "deep" and
developed one. See Mark Ramseyer, Remarks at the Japan Society Conference: For
Whom the Corporation? Corporate Governance in Japan, the U.S. and Europe,
supra note 8.
136. The French mutual fund falls under the general category of "Les
organismes de placement collectif en valeurs mobilibres" or O.P.C.V.M. . A common
kind of mutual fund is the S.I.C.A.V. ("SICAV") or "Socidt6 d'investissement A
capital variable," whose purpose is to invest in financial instruments. See PEZARD,
supra note 113, at 239-42. The SICAV and similar funds are generally restricted
in the kinds of securities in which they can invest and have a diversification requirement. See Guyon, supra note 117, at 388-89. The French mutual fund industry is one of the biggest in the world amounting to two trillion French francs in
November 1993. France: SICAVS Increases Investment in Top 100 Shares, LES
EcHos, Mar. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, TXTWE File. This
represented 22% of French household assets. Tomorrow the World, ECONOMIST,
Nov. 27, 1993, at 20. The primary underlying investments of the funds, however,
are bonds and money market instruments.
137. There are no public or private pension funds in France in the U.S. sense,
because pension obligations are covered by the state and funded by contributions
from employers and employees. See Alice Pezard, Pensions in France (Feb. 18,
1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International
Law). However, legislation permitting companies to create private pension funds
(fonds de pension) has been proposed. See PEZARD, supra note 113, at 266-67 (discussing recent proposed legislation in the Senate to establish pension funds). Moreover, French citizens are being encouraged to save for their retirement by means
of tax benefits for investing in a stock portfolio. See id. at 261-62. French politicians are increasingly recognizing that private pension funds must assume a significant role in covering retirement expenses of its citizens, given the weight such
expenses now place on the French companies and the public budget. Cf., Gordon,
supra note 76, at 71-72 (discussing the high level of social taxes and charges
placed upon French citizens and companies).
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with the foreign funds that will increasingly be marketed in
France, French funds must emphasize "bottom line" total return and will be by definition at odds with any corporate governance system based upon noneconomic purposes and favoring controlling shareholders. 8' In sum, French capital market developments point to the emergence of corporate governance &l'am6ricaine;governance with dispersed shareholdings
and American-style institutional investors.
2. European Union Developments
The European Union, of which France is a member, is also
placing significant pressure on French corporate governance.
The EU is creating a single European market with an economically liberal orientation."' As a way of achieving this goal,

138. The apparent reason for this lack of "activism" on bottom line issues is
that French funds are often sponsored and managed by French banks, which have
other relationships with issuers whose stock is owned by the funds. This conflict
can lead to silence by the funds in situations that might otherwise call for activism. See Leparmentier, supra note 116, at 64 (discussing how such conflict leads
to passivity on the part of funds); cf Guyon, supra note 117, at 387. Whether
such passivity can continue in the face of competition from non-French funds,
which are established in other EU countries but can be marketed in France, remains to be seen. See Karmel, supra note 132, at 10, 16 (discussing the potential
of the directive on UCITS (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable
Securities) to produce a new breed of institutional investor in Europe); Nunes,
supra note 117, at 235-36 (discussing how France has harmonized its law in line
with the directive and has authorized non-French funds to be marketed in France).
139. This orientation has its origins in the Treaty of Rome, which has as its
goal the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital through the (then)
European Community. This goal has been further promoted in the White Paper of
1985, which established a program for a single European market where resources
flow freely to the most economically worthy end users. See Karmel, supra note
132, at 3-4; M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers, The Harmonisation of Company, Stock Exchange and Securities Law in Europe and the United States, in HARMONISATION OF
COMPANY AND SECURITIES LAW: THE EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN APPROACH 1, 2-3
(1989); Manning G. Warren III, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The
Achievements of the European Communities, 31 HARV. INTL L.J. 185, 195-97 (1990)
[hereinafter Warren, Global Harmonization];Manning G. Warren III, The European
Union's Investment Services Directive, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 181, 191 (1994)
[hereinafter Warren, Investment Services Directive] (discussing economic benefits
arising from unification of the European financial markets). As Geoffrey Fitchew
(Director-General, Directorate-General XV, Financial Intitutions and Company
Law, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels) has explained the benefits:
The diagnosis made by the Commission which entered office in 1985 was
that Europe had been falling seriously behind the United States and
Japan in both economic performance and potential and that this gap
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the EU is harmonizing laws among its member states dealing
with corporate governance, the securities markets, and other
matters that would have an impact upon corporate governance.14 ° So significant is the EU pressure that some French
authorities believe that it is the most likely source of change to
French corporate governance.'
Most importantly, the EU is weaning its member states off
the practice of providing state financing to companies, often
resorting to sanctions in the process.' If member states are
not the primary source of company capital, companies have no
choice but to look to the capital markets, with the accompanying loss of state control.
As less state aid is forthcoming,

could not be bridged unless remaining barriers to the freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and persons (both natural and legal) were
removed ....

The clear expectations of the White Paper are that the removal of
these barriers will lead not only to sharper competition and hence to a
general improvement in factor productivity, but ultimately to increased
investment by industry and services in order to take advantage of the
economies of scale offered by a genuinely unified market.
Geoffrey Fitchew, Political Choices, in EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW: LEGAL AND EcONOMIC ANALYSIS ON INTEGRATION AND HARMONIZATION, supra note 5, at 4.

140. See generally Richard M. Buxbaum & Klaus J. Hopt, Legal Harmonization
and the Business Enterprise Revisited, in EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIc ANALYSIS ON INTEGRATION AND HARMONIZATION, supra note 5, at 391412; LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE, supra note 5.

141. Interview with Alice Pezard, Magistrat, Conseil Juridique du Directeur,
Direction du Tresor, Minist~re de l'conomie, in Paris, France (June 27, 1994).
142. See KERNINON, supra note 94, at 93-94 (discussing Articles 91-93 of the
Treaty of Rome that limit aid that a member state can give to a company). As
Kerninon explains:
La Commission est en vdrit6 animde par la volont6 de combattre tout ce
qui, a l'int~rieur de la Communaut6, peut entraver l'6panouissement de
la concurrence, tenue pour la source principale de l'efficacit6 6conomique.
A ce titre, la survie de firmes artificiellement assur6e par le canal
d'aides 6tatiques apparaft nuisible et g~ndratrice d'un inutile gaspillage
de ressources publiques.
Id. at 96. See, e.g., Beverley Head, France: French Cut Losses as Cash Injection
Does Not Compute, AUS. FIN. REV., Mar. 11, 1994, available in LEXIS, Europe
Library, ALLEUR File (describing European Commission's deliberations over
whether to permit further French government investments in Bull). See generally
Tony Prosser & Michael Moran, From National Uniqueness to Supra-National
Constitution, in PRIVATIZATION AND REGULATORY CHANGE IN EUROPE 145, 150-51

(Michael Moran & Tony Prosser eds., 1994).
143. See KERNINON, supra note 94, at 96 ("Le march6 financier doit donc 8tre
le pourvoyeur naturel de capitaux pour les entreprises qui, publiques ou privdes,
se voient contraintes de faire en sorte que l'6quilibre de leur gestion ne ddpende
pas de concours 6manant de l2tat.").
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company management has no choice but to look to capital
market financing. It must thus demand more management
autonomy from the state and it should encounter shareholderowners with pure economic purposes."'
Equally significant is pressure arising from relevant EU
directives dealing with corporate governance and capital market issues. I have already mentioned the Undertakings for
Collective Investment in Transferable Securities directive,
which may expand the class of European institutional investors, and the Thirteenth Directive dealing with tender offers-both already implemented in national legislation by
France. Many of the other relevant directives, both already
passed by the European Council and proposed, but not enacted, would produce a more competitive market environment and
are thus5 incompatible with a closed system of corporate gover14
nance.
3. Summary
French corporate governance is feeling pressures to
change. French government, market, and business parties are
creating a modern liquid market system that presents corporate financing possibilities potentially incompatible with state
control. Moreover, the EU has made it increasingly difficult for
France to provide financing to state-owned companies, thus
turning these companies to the capital markets, and it is attempting to create a unified capital market and company structure. Therefore, when we consider the involvement of United

144. See id. at 98-99. Given this EU pressure, it is understandable that European governments are now taking the ultimate step of pushing companies to an
entire dependence upon the capital markets (i.e., privatization).
145. For a listing and description of the relevant directives, see Karmel, supra
note 132, at 6-10; Andreas J. Roquette, New Developments Relating to the Inter.
nationalization of the Capital Markets: A Comparison of Legislative Reforms in the
United States, the European Community, and Germany, 14 U. PA. J. IN'L BUS. L.
565, 587-99 (1994); Warren III, Global Harmonization, supra note 139, at 197-224.
A particularly significant Directive is the Investment Services Directive, which
establishes prudential standards for broker-dealers and introduces the important
concept of recognition of a broker-dealer organized and located in one home state
by other member states, where such broker-dealer would be permitted to conduct
business. See Warren III, Investment Services Directive, supra note 139, at 198-217;
see also Norman S. Poser, Automation of Securities Markets and the European
Community's Proposed Investment Services Directive, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.

29 (1992).
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States institutional investors in the recent wave of French
privatizations beginning in 1993, we must understand that
French corporate governance is at a crossroads.
V. FRENCH PRIVATIZATION AND UNITED STATES INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS
This final part examines the transformation of French
corporate governance revealed in, and to an extent caused by,
the 1993 privatizations and the place of United States institutional investors in the transformation. It first outlines the
history of recent French privatization and overall privatization
mechanics. It next examines the transformation of French
corporate governance as occasioned by the French privatization. This part then reviews the investment and corporate
governance activity by United States institutional investors in
the French privatization. Finally, it draws several conclusions
about the role of these investors in French corporate governance.
A. French Privatization
1. History
French privatization began in 1986 with the resumption of
parliamentary power by the French Right.146 French right
parties allied themselves and obtained a majority in the
French National Assembly, which enabled them to form a
government. 1' They shared power with Frangois Mitterand,

146. The French Right was basically represented by two political parties, the
Rassemblement pour la Rdpublique ("RPR"), a party with its origins in the approach of General de Gaulle and headed by Jacques Chirac, and the Union pour
la Dmocratie Frangaise ("UDF"), headed by the former French president, Valdry
Giscard d'Estaing (1974-1981). The 1986 legislative elections gave a union of rightwing parties a bare majority in the French National Assembly. JEAN-JACQUES
BECKER, HISTOIRE POLITIQUE DE LA FRANCE DEPUIS 1945, at 179-80 (1992).
Although privatizations started in 1986, in the early 1980s Socialist governments, recognizing the difficulty in government financing of state-owned companies,
permitted the companies to turn to financial markets to raise some equity capital.
See DURUPTY, supra note 93, at 25-29; KERNINON, supra note 94, at 40.
147. For a discussion of the French political system, see JEAN ROSSETTO, LES
INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES DE LA FRANCE (1992). Under the Constitution of the
French Fifth Republic, the president has the power to select the prime minister,
the chief government executive. However, he generally must select this minister
from the party or parties controlling the National Assembly. Id. at 68-69. The
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A
a Socialist president whose term had not yet expired.'
major plank in the platform of the new government was the
privatization of publicly-owned companies, both those nationalized by the Socialists in 1982 and those whose nationalization
dated to the immediate post-War years. "'
A neo-liberal economic belief that companies would function more efficiently in the private market, i.e., that the market would direct resources to the most efficiently operated
enterprises, inspired the 1986 privatization. However, as Professors Graham and Prosser have explained, this liberal account fails to explain fully the privatization movement.'
Many of the companies on the privatization 'list" were in good
financial condition and were major global competitors. 5 '
Thus, these companies were already subject to market discipline. More importantly, the French government privatized
companies because, with a growing budget deficit, it could not
provide them with the funds necessary to enable them to compete in the global marketplace and because proceeds of their
sale helped to fill this deficit.' 5'
In addition, through privatization, the French government
intended to contribute to a goal of developing the Bourse by increasing its small capitalization and its liquidity.' Individual French citizens were encouraged to invest in the

prime minister in turn proposes to the president a list of other government officials or ministers. Id. at 90.
148. This period in which a Socialist president co-existed with a Rightist prime
minister (Jacques Chirac) was known as the first "cohabitation."
149. See DURUPTY, supra note 93, at 32.
150. COSMO GRAHAM & TONY PROSSER, PRIVATISING PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 26-36
(1991); Michael Moran & Tony Prosser, Introduction: Politics, Privatization and
Constitutions, in PRIVATIZATION AND REGULATORY CHANGE IN EUROPE, supra note
142, at 1-13.
151. See Bauer, supra note 113, at 51 ("From a strictly economic point of view
the liberal credo was very watered down: the French remained faithful to the
practice of 'nationalising losses and privatising profits.'").
152. See ROLAND LASKINE, LES PRIVATISATIONS: ENJEUX STRATtGIQUES ET
OPPORTUNITAS BOURSIERES 11 (1993) ("Le manque de moyens financiers de lttat
est A l'origine d'un d6ficit chronique de fonds propres de nombreuses entreprises
publiques. Soit l1tat dispose de la totalit6 du capital, et le coot financier d'une
augmentation de capital de grande ampleur n'est pas i sa portee. Soit il ne dis-

pose que de 50% des actions et ils'oppose A toute augmentation de capital qui
pourrait lui faire perdre la majoritd."); DURUPTY, supra note 93, at 33.

153. See DURUPTY, supra note 93, at 34 ("Le but de la privatisation est de
donner h la France les moyens d'attirer les investissements internationaux et de
changer en consquence les dimensions de notre march6 financier.").
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privatizations so that they would have an economic stake in
the process (and would be reluctant to agree to a
renationalization)."' Because privatization would involve
large public sales of stock, French banks and brokers would
gain experience in this complex area, which would improve
their own global competitiveness 55
In 1986, the French government proposed, and the French
National Assembly passed, several privatization laws. The law
of 1 July 1986 established the general framework for the process and included as an annex a list of the companies to be
privatized. 5 ' The law of 6 August 1986 established actual
privatization procedures after the Socialist President
Mitterand made clear his unwillingness to cooperate in the
privatization process. 5 7 Although opponents challenged the

154. See GRAHAM & PROSSER, supra note 150, at 26; Bauer, supra note 113, at
54. As Professors Graham and Prosser observe, this reliance upon individual
shareholders was risky because it meant that the privatization had to succeed
economically and thus that privatized enterprises could not fail. "To a government
disposed to increase the number of such shareholders the incentives will be strong
to limit the vulnerability of an enterprise to market forces in order to maximize
new shareholdings; in this sense the ideological and the more directly political
considerations may run counter to each other." Id.
155. See id. at 31 ("In addition, the prominent role of the nationalized banks
provided a further set of arguments for their privatization in view of the internationalization of capital and increasing bank competition in Europe.").
156. Under this law, legislative authorization was required for any transfer to
the private sphere of (i) companies where the State directly controlled more than
50% of the capital ("entreprises publiques de premier rang") or 0i) companies that
entered into the public sector as a result of a particular legislative action (i.e.,
nationalization), whether or not controlled at 50% directly by the state. A list of
65 companies was established in this annex and included industrial companies
(Pdchiney, Thomson, Rh6ne-Poulenc, Saint-Gobain, CGE (now Alcatel-Alsthom),
Matra, Compagnie des Machines Bull, Compagnie G6n6rale de Constructions
T6ldphoniques), two financial companies (Compagnie Financi~re de Suez (now
Compagnie de Suez) and Compagnie Financibre de Paribas), banks (Socidtd
Gdndrale, Crddit Lyonnais, Banque Nationale de Paris) and insurance companies
(Union des Assurances de Paris, Assurances O-nrales de France). Left to administrative decision was the privatization of companies not falling in the above categories or the sale to private parties of shares in state-owned companies in cases
where the state maintained control. For general descriptions of this law, see
DURUPTY, supra note 93, at 36-45; GRAHAM & PROSSER, supra note 150, at 85-88;
Olivier d'Ormesson & Didier Martin, L'6laboration des lois de privatisations: Prjsentation g6ndrale du cadre juridique, 13 DROIT PRACTIQUE COMMERCIALE
INTERNATIONALE [D.P.C.I.] 405, 412-17 (1987).
157. President Mitterand refused to facilitate privatization by signing an administrative order. The August law enumerated the ways in which privatization
could be effected (e.g., by public sales), the procedure to follow for establishing a
price and determining purchasers and the manner in which administrative authori-
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Constitutionnel upheld them as constitutional with some modifications.' 58

The privatizations planned by these laws, which established a deadline of 1991 for their completion, was an economic
and political success. Within one year, a third of the planned
privatizations had been carried out and included such companies as Alcatel-Alsthom, Credit Commercial de France, Havas
(communications group), Paribas, Saint Gobain, Soci6t6
Gen6rale, Suez, TF1 (television station), as well as numerous
smaller companies.'59 The 1987 world stock market crash
slowed the privatizations; the 1988 French legislative elections,
where the Socialists returned to power in the National Assembly, completely stopped them. 6 Following the elections,
President Mitterand announced that there would be neither
more privatizations nor more nationalizations. 6 ' However,
the Socialist government continued the process of "opening"
the capital of state-controlled companies to private capital
market investors. 2
Privatization recommenced with the return of the rightwing coalition to power in the spring 1993 legislative elections.
Not only did this coalition simply return to its privatization
program, 6 3 but it felt economic pressures that made privat-

zation would be granted for sales of companies not falling into the premier rang.
See DURUPTY, supra note 93, at 50-58; d'Ormesson & Martin, sppra note 156, at
426-55.
158. The Conseil Constitutionnel, which reviews for constitutionality laws promulgated by the French National Assembly, ROSETTo, supra note 147, at 171-79,
determined in its decision of June 25, 26, 1986 that the draft privatization laws
were constitutional subject to three general limitations: (i) a company that constituted a "service public national" (e.g., education, social security) could not be privatized; (ii) nor could a company that occupied a "monopole de fait" (e.g., gas and
electricity); and (iii) the State had to receive "une indemnisation juste et 6quitable"
in the privatization (Le., company had to be sold at a price not less than its value
determined in accordance with proper valuation methods). See DURUPTY, supra
note 93, at 45-50; GRAHAM & PROSSER, supra note 150, at 98 (generally discussing
constitutional limitations on French privatization); d'Ormesson & Martin, supra
note 156, at 419-25.
159. See Bauer, supra note 113, at 51 (noting that such companies included
those recently nationalized in 1982 and those nationalized following the War).
160. KERNINON, supra note 94, at 42.
161. Id.
162. See LASKINE, supra note 152, at 23. These partial sales included that of
Elf in 1990, Total in 1992 and Rh6ne-Poulenc in 1993.
163. See ECK, supra note 81, at 52.
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ization absolutely necessary. Because of high unemployment
partly owing to the recession in the early 1990s and increasingly large financial burdens due to social welfare spending,
the French government was running a significant budget deficit. Receipts from privatization sales helped fill this deficit."'
These receipts were intended to be used to prepare other companies for privatization (e.g., by giving them additional capital
or removing significant liabilities from their balance

sheets). 6 '
Because the law identifying the companies to be privatized
was no longer in effect, the French National Assembly passed
new privatization laws modeled upon the old, with some differences with respect to the manner of privatization.' The laws
established a list of companies to be privatized that included
those on the 1986 list that had not been privatized and new
additions, such as Renault.'67 The program, which is now entering its second year of operation, has several major
privatizations to its credit and others currently planned.'
164. See LASKINE, supra note 152, at 16-17.
165. It has been reported that, in 1993, the French government obtained 47.6
billion French francs from privatization sales. Of these, 19 billion were used to
improve the financial condition of state-owned companies; 9 billion went to help
address unemployment; and 18 billion was used to address the deficit. See France
1993 Privatization Raised 47.6 Bln Francs, Reuters, Mar. 16, 1994, available in
LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLEUR File.
166. The new law provides that companies included on an annex, or any companies whose principal purpose is to own shares of the listed companies, are eligible to be privatized. It basically amends the law of August 6, 1986. Loi No. 93923 du 19 Juillet 1993 [Law No. 93-923 of July 19, 19931, art. 2, Journal Officiel
de la Republique [J.O.], July 21, 1993, at 10255, 1993 Dalloz-Sirez, Lggislation
[D.S.L.1 396.
167. The list included the following 21 companies (9 of which had not been on
the 1986 list): A6rospatiale (new), Socidt6 Nationale Industrielle, Compagnie
Nationale Air-France (new), Banque Hervet, Banque Nationale de Paris, Caisse
Centrale de Reassurance (new), C.N.P. Assurances (new), Compagnie des Machines
Bull, Compagnie GCn~rale Maritime (new), Cr6dit Lyonnais, Pdchiney, Regie
Nationale des Usines Renault (new), Rh6ne-Poulenc, Assurances G6ndrales de
France, Groupe des Assurances Nationales, Union des Assurances de Paris, Soci~t6
Nationale d'Exploitation Industrielle des Tabacs et Allumettes (new), Soci~t6 Marseillaise de Crddit, Soci6t6 Nationale d'Ittude et de Construction de Moteurs
d'Aviation (new), Elf-Acquitaine, Thomson S.A., Usinor Sacilor (new). PEZARD, supra note 113, at 358.
168. The French government has so far proceeded with five privatizations
through public sales of securities on French and international securities markets.
Of these, four have involved some of the strongest economically of the 21 companies, two of whose shares (Rh6ne-Poulenc and Elf) had already been sold to the
public in France and internationally. See Arr~t6 du 4 Octobre 1993 [Order of Oct.
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2. The Privatization Process
French constitutional constraints determined the privatization structure. As noted above, the Conseil Constitutionnel
stated that, under French constitutional law, the government
had to receive adequate compensation for the sale of stateowned companies (just as private parties had to be adequately
compensated in the original nationalizations)." 9 Accordingly,
both the earlier and later privatization laws established an
independent Commission to oversee the privatization process. 7° The Commission evaluated a state-owned company
that the government proposed to sell and established a "floor"
price below which the company could not be sold.' 7 ' This legal requirement posed a potentially difficult practical problem,
because, if the floor were set too high, the potential buyers

4, 19931, J.O., Oct. 5, 1993, at 13808, 1993 D.S.L. 514 (Banque nationale de Paris); Arrt6 du 15 Novembre 1993 [Order of Nov. 15, 19931, J.O., Nov. 16, 1993, at
15801, 1993 D.S.L. 544 (Rh6ne-Poulenc); Arrt du 2 Fdvrier 1994 [Order of Feb.
2, 19941, J.O., Feb. 3, 1994, at 1870, 1994 D.S.L. 175 (Elf-Acquitaine); Arrtd du
25 Avril 1994 [Order of Apr. 25, 1994], J.O., Apr. 26, 1994, at 6107, 1994 D.S.L.
262 (Union des Assurances de Paris); Arr~t6 du Feb. 6, 1995, J.O., Feb. 7, 1995,
at 2084, _ D.S.L. - (Soci6te Nationale dExploitation Industrielle des Tabacs et
Allumettes (SEITA)). The government has also sold a minority share of the
automaker Renault in a public offering. See Arr~te du 2 Novembre 1994 [Order of
The government has
Nov. 2, 19941, J.O., Nov. __, 1994 at 15610, 1994 D.S.L. _.
also announced that it intends soon to privatize fully, through public sales, the
Socidtd Centrale Assurances Gdn~rales de France, see Ddcret No. 94-195 du 8
Mars 1994 [Decree No. 94-195 of Mar. 8, 19941, J.O., Mar. 9, 1994, at 3732, 1994
D.S.L. 224.
169. See GRAHAM & PROSSER, supra note 150, at 20 (discussing decision of
Conseil Constitutionnel on this matter).
170. Article 3 of the 1986 law had established a Commission d'evaluation des
entreprises publiques. Loi no. 86-912 du 9 Aofit 1986 [Law No. 86-912 of Aug. 6,
19861, art. 3, J.O., Aug. 7, 1986, at 9695, 1986 D.S.L. 430. The 1993 law amended
this article by organizing a Commission de ]a privatisation. Loi no. 93-923 du 19
Juillet 1993 [Law No. 93-923 of July 19, 1993], art. 4, J.O., July 21, 1993, at
10255, 1993 D.S.L. 396. In both cases, the Commission was composed of seven
members, who, during their five-year term, were barred from any company management or membership on a board of directors. Moreover, for five years following
their term, they were barred from similar activities with any company that had
purchased a formerly state-owned company.
171. As stated in the 1993 law, the Commission was to "ddterminer la valeur
des entreprises." Loi no. 93-923 du 19 Juillet 1993 [Law No. 93-923 of July 19,
1993], art. 4(I)(1), J.O., July 21, 1993, at 10255, 1993 D.S.L. 396. In the case of a
sale other than through a large public offering, the Commission would also evaluate "le choix de l'acqudreur". Id. art. 4(2). In addition, the 1993 law requires the
transaction to occur within 30 days of the date when the Commission gives its
opinion. See id. art. 4(VI).
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would be deterred from purchasing shares of the company."'
Both the 1986 and 1993 laws gave the government considerable flexibility in structuring a sale, with the major form
being public sales on stock markets." 3 These public sales involved several separate offerings. Because of the political goals
of the privatization, the primary and largest one was a public
offering to French retail investors.'7 4 There was also an ac-

172. Professors Graham and Prosser identify the conflict generated by this
requirement. The state needs to raise as much funds as possible and to meet the
constitutional constraints, which argues that it should set a high a price as possible. However, in order to attract many small investors to the process and to the
stock markets, and to fulfill the ideological goals of the privatization, the
privatizations must be priced low. GRAHAM & PROSSER, supra note 150, at 98.
For example, in the Elf privatization, the floor price was set at FF 376.4,
and shares were sold to the French public at FF 385. The highest share price of
Elf was in the neighborhood of FF 434 before the privatization. ELF, supra note
50, at 20, 22; see e.g., Paris:Elf and Fitness in the French Sell-Off Spree, OBSERVER, Feb. 27, 1994, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, OBSRVR File.
173. See Loi no. 93-923 du 19 Juillet 1993 [Law No. 93-923 of July 19, 1993],
art. 2, J.O., July 21, 1993, at 10255, 1993 D.S.L. 396 (referring to procedures
established in Loi no. 86-912 du 6 Aofit 1986 [Law No. 86-912 of Aug. 6, 19861,
J.O., Aug. 7, 1986, at 9695, 1986 D.S.L. 430).
174. It must be remembered that the French privatization is primarily an internal political affair that demands a successful placement among French citizens.
The key aspect of a public sale is thus the offre publique de vente in France to
French citizens and residents. In order to encourage these persons to participate
in the privatizations, the French government widely advertized the privatizations
and gave investors tax benefits. See LASKINE, supra note 152, at 47 (discussing
the Plan d'Eparne en Action, where French citizens can set up a plan to purchase
shares in French companies without taxation of dividends or capital gains). Moreover, success of an offering in the domestic French market is a key to success in
the international markets because international investors are encouraged by this
domestic success. France: Elf Sale Was a Success, CROSSBORDER MONITOR, Feb. 23,
1994, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLEUR File.
In the Banque Nationale de Paris offering, 37,507,489 of the 72,129,786
shares offered were offered to French retail investors. See BANQUE NATIONALE DE
PARIS, OFFERING CIRCULAR 8 (1993) [hereinafter BNP]. For Rhbne-Poulenc, it was
52,330,983 out of 88,099,298. See RHONE-POULENC, PROSPECTUS 9 (1993). For ElfAcquitaine, it was 38,641,489 out of 67,085,918. See ELF, supra note 50, at 7. For
UAP, it was 54,402,978 out of 105,126,529. See SOCIPTI CENTRALE UNION DES
ASSURANCES DE PARIS, PROSPECTUS 7 (1994) [hereinafter UAP]. For SEITA, it was
16,616,912 out of a total of 45,338,792. See Arrt4 du Feb. 6, 1995 [Order of Feb.
6, 1995], J.O., Feb. 7, 1995, at 2084, __ D.S.L. _ Arrdt6 du Feb. 17, 1995 [Order
of Feb. 17, 1995], J.O., Feb. 18, 1995, at 2665, _ D..L._. In certain cases, additional shares were sold in the retail offering after being "clawed back" from the
institutional offering (Rh6ne-Poulene's 52,330,983 includes 4,757,362 shares "clawed
back" from the international offering). In nearly every case, the offering price to
French retail investors was lower than that to other buyers (except for employees):
in BNP, the offering price was the same, FF 240; in Rhone-Poulenc, the retail
offering price was FF 135, as opposed to an institutional price of FF 146; in Elf,
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companying sale to institutions, both in France and internationally, primarily to place stock that could not all be absorbed
by the French retail market. 7 5 In addition, the public offering process also included offerings to employees of the privatized company, or of its subsidiaries, 7 ' and a private sale to
certain large, strategic investors.'7 7
B. Corporate Governance
A significant part of the French privatization program,
both as designed and as implemented, involved corporate governance of the newly privatized companies, and, in fact, indicated the transformation of French corporate governance.
French privatization treated corporate governance in two respects: (i) the continued ownership and control of privatized
companies by the French government and (ii) creation of a

the retail price was FF 385, against an institutional price of 403; and in UAP, the
retail and institutional offering prices were close-FF 152 to FF 155; and in
SEITA, the retail price was FF 129 to an institutional price of FF 133. The reason for the same price in the BNP retail and institutional offerings is that the
government wanted to ensure that its first privatization would be a national and
international success. See French Privatisation, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1993, at 20.
Although all the offerings have been popular so far, their popularity, measured by
the rate of domestic oversubscription, may be declining. BNP was 5 times oversubscribed, Rhone-Poulenc was 4.4 times oversubscribed, Elf was only 3 times
oversubscribed, UAP was 2.5 times oversubscribed and Renault was 1.4 times
oversubscribed.
175. The institutional offerings comprised a significant amount of the overall
offering, subject to a legal limitation imposed by Article 10 of the 1986 law (as
amended by Article 8 of the 1993 law) that no sale to foreigners could exceed 20%
of the capital of the company. Although the BNP offering had separate tranches
for French institutions (12,117,804 shares) and for institutions outside France
(22,504,493), BNP, supra note 174, at 8, the other offerings simply combined the
shares sold in the international offering. For Rh6ne-Poulenc, it was 26,958,385,
RHONE-POULENC, supra note 174, at 8; for Elf, 21,735,837, ELF, supra note 50, at
7; for UAP, 40,210,898 shares, UAP, supra note 174, at 7; for Renault, 11,578,500
shares; and 10,643,682 shares for SEITA.
176. Under the privatization law, up to 10% of a public offering of shares of a
privatized company must be reserved for employees of the company or of its subsidiaries. See Loi no. 86-912 du 6 Aofit 1986 [Law No. 86-912 of Aug. 6, 1986],
art. 6, J.O., Aug. 7, 1986, at 9695, 1986 D.S.L. 430. Any individual employee could
take shares whose total value was not in excess of five times the annual ceiling
for social security payments. In addition, employees could receive a reduction in
the offering price up to 20% less than the price proposed to the public, as well as
possibilities of deferred payments and of receiving "bonus" shares. In each privatization, therefore, a significant portion of the shares (i.e., 10%) were set aside for
employees.
177. See infra subpart V.B.2.
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stable network of shareholders for these companies.
1. Continued Government Ownership and Control
The French government's continued involvement in privatized companies would appear to be relatively simple. In many,
if not most, cases, the government was completely divesting
itself of direct or indirect ownership of the companies. However, both the 1986 and 1993 privatization legislation gave the
government one obvious opportunity to retain control of privatized companies. In the 1993 law, the French government had
only to retain one share in the privatized company and, by
decree, have it transformed into a "golden share" or "action
spdcifique."78 By means of this share, the government would
have one or more of the following rights: (i) prior authorization
by the Minister of the Economy for the acquisition, by any
person (or group of persons acting in concert) of share capital
or voting rights in a privatized company beyond certain limits
established by the decree; (ii) the right to place two nonvoting
state representatives on the board of directors; and (iii) the
right to oppose any sale or other disposition of assets if such
transaction adversely affected national interests. 7 9 If a person purchased shares in violation of any restriction pursuant
to (i) above, it would lose any voting rights as to shares in
excess of the given threshold and be compelled to sell these
shares within three months.' 0 Unlike the 1986 law, the 1993
laws did not place a term on the golden shares.
The statutory language providing for the "golden share" is
vague, speaking of its use to protect national interests: "si la
protection des int~r~ts nationaux 6xige."'5 ' This vagueness

178. The concept of the "golden share" was borrowed from U.I. privatizations.
See LASKINE, supra note 152, at 85.
179. See Loi no. 93-923 du 19 Juillet 1993 [Law No. 93-923 of July 19, 1993],
art. 7, J.O., July 21, 1993, at 10255, 1993 D.S.L. 396. See also PEZARD, supra note
113, at 386 (discussing the "golden share"); Jean-Luc Delahaye, La Golden Share &
la frangaise: laction spdcifique, 13 D.P.C.I. 579 (1987) (discussing use of golden
share in 1986 privatizations).
180. This penalty is similar to those imposed on purchasers who pass thresholds set either by French law or by the certificate of incorporation of a particular
company.
181. These "national interests" must be in addition to those specifically recognized by EU law, for the second section of Article 10 of the August 1986 law, as
revised by the 1993 law, provides that, pursuant to EU law, the Minister of the
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has not posed problems in the 1993 privatization because the
golden share has been used only once, in the privatization of
Elf-Acquitaine, the world-class oil and gas company. In fact, its
use with Elf suggests some coherent meaning to the terms
"int6r~ts nationaux" and "ind6pendance nationale"-they deal
with the protection of French strategic resources, such as energy.1 2 Unlike in the other three complete privatizations sold
on the public markets, in Elf, the French state continues to
hold indirectly 13% of the share capital and voting rights.
Moreover, its golden share gives it all of the above rights provided by the privatization law and is of unlimited duration.1 83
It would appear then, that continued state involvement in
ownership and control of privatized companies would be easy
to detect: either the French government maintains a direct or
indirect interest and/or veto through a golden share, or it does
not. One would assume that if such indicia of ownership or
control are not present, then the French government's involvement in the corporate governance of these companies would be
at an end. That the privatized companies are generally in
competitive industries (i.e., not providing essential services
such as electricity) and thus not demanding of special government regulation supports this view. However, given the tradition of colbertisme and the recent history of strong state involvement in the economy, as well as the tradition of the state
career for company executives, the state may try to maintain
some indirect influence over privatized companies through
another privatization technique, as discussed in the following
subsection.

Economy can limit to 5% holdings by non-French parties (including those from
other EU states) in companies dealing with certain sensitive sectors, such as
health, security and defense. Loi no. 93-923 du 19 Juillet 1993 [Law No. 93-923 of
July 19, 19931, art. 7, J.O., July 21, 1993 at 10255, 1993 D.S.L. 396. See PEZARD,
supra note 113, at 387-88. Confusion arises because a further provision of the
privatization law states that, if the "inddpendence nationale est en cause" (emphasis added), the golden share cannot be transformed into an ordinary share.
182. Mine. Pezard suggests that the term "ind6pendance nationale" is much
more restrictive than "intdrAts nationaux" in that its focus is on protecting activities necessary for national sovereignty. In her view, providing certain forms of
energy clearly falls into this category. See PEZARD, supra note 113, at 388.
183. The acquisition thresholds requiring prior approval of the French Minister
of the Economy are 10%, 20% and 33.33%. Government approval is needed for the
sale or pledge of specific important subsidiaries of Elf. See ELF, supra note 50, at
17.
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2. Stable Shareholders

A more significant phenomenon than the golden share
with respect to corporate governance of French privatized companies is the creation of a small group of stable shareholders,
or, in French, the noyau dur. This phenomenon is most developed in the French corporate structure, although it is being
copied in Spain, and Italy. The 1986 privatization law permitted the Minister of the Economy to privatize a company by
finding purchasers other than through a public sale, i.e., by
private sales. The 1993 privatization law modified this procedure by addressing the issue of the secrecy of the process and
accompanying suspicion that the Minister selected purchasers
for political reasons." However, even the 1993 law gives no
intended purpose for the Minister's exercise of this power,
other than the general privatization goal.'85
In practice, the Minister has used the stable shareholder
structure to ensure that a controlling block of the capital (and
voting rights) of a privatized company are put in the hands of
a relatively small group of other companies, particularly financial institutions. This result is accomplished in two ways. First,
one or a few large shareholders are established for a privatized
company; ' invariably some or all of such shareholders are
affiliated financial institutions whose collective ownership of
the privatized company reaches approximately 15-20%. At a
second level, there is formed a slightly larger group of other

184. The 1993 law stipulates that the Minister fix the choice of private purchasers and the conditions of the transaction based upon the advice of the Privatization Commission. See Loi no. 93-923 du 19 Juillet 1993 [Law No. 93-923 of
July 19, 1993], art. 5, J.O., July 21, 1993, at 10255, 1993 D.S.L. 396. A decree of
the Conseil d'Etat in turn establishes rules concerning the solicitation of offers
from private parties for participation in the noyau dur of a given company. This
decree states that, upon publication of a solicitation of offers in the Journal
Officiel, potential buyers have 15 days within which to submit their offer as well
as their financial qualifications. This information is forwarded to the Privatization
Commission for evaluation. See D~cret no. 93-1041 du 3 Septembre 1993 [Decree
No. 93-1041 of Sept. 3, 1993], art. 1, J.O., Sept. 5, 1993, at 12501, 1993 D.S.L.
497. See generally PEZARD, supra note 113, at 371-73.
185. See Bauer, supra note 113, at 55 (discussing the flexibility given to the
Minister of the Economy with respect to these transactions).
186. The privatization law generally prohibits any purchaser from acquiring
more than 5% of a company at the time of the privatization. Id. Thus, these larger shareholders usually already have significant stakes in the privatized companies
and add to their holdings through the current privatization.

BROOK. J. INTL L.

[Vol.

=XI:

institutions holding stock in the company, with this second
group together having approximately 20% of the capital (and
votes).18 Thus, once the noyau dur for a privatized company
is set, other companies selected by the Minister with the advice of the Privatization Commission hold 30-40% of its capital
(and votes).
The formation of noyaux dur, in the related privatizations
of the Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP) and the Union des
Assurances de Paris (UAP) (one of the largest insurance companies in France), shows the result of this process. These
privatizations are related because BNP and UAP are each the
major investor in the other, a respective position enhanced by
the privatization process. In 1990, BNP and UAP formed a
cross-shareholding arrangement that was part of joint efforts
in the development of the marketing of insurance products
through banks.'8 8 In BNP's privatization, UAP's shareholding
went from 9.8% to approximately 15%; in UAP's privatization,
BNP's ownership of UAP remained the same, at 19%, although
agreements had been reached to lower the bank's holding to
15%.' At a second level, Dresdner Bank owns 10% of BNP
as a result of the privatization. 9 ' In UAP's case, the second
level comes from a cross-holding with the Suez Group, a large
financial and industrial conglomerate, where each side holds
approximately 5% of the other.'9 1 Finally, other companies
collectively control a significant percentage of each company.
In BNP's case, this group owns approximately 15%; in UAP's
case, the ownership is 11%.192 Thus, following privatization,
187. One can think of these various shareholders in circular terms, with an
inner circle representing the large shareholders and circles with steadily larger
diameters representing the second group of institutions. Frangois Morin, of the
Laboratoire d'6tudes et de recherches en 6conomie de ]a production ("LEREP") of
the Universit6 de Toulouse-i, has made vivid graphs of cross-shareholdings in
privatized companies. See Morin, supra note 134 (describing cross-shareholdings in
BNP); Frangois Morin, La recomposition du pouvoir iconomique: Les trois p~les du
coeur financier, LE MONDE, Mar. 8, 1994, (L'conomie section), at II. See generally
FRANgOIS MORIN & CLAUDE DuPuy, LE COEUR FINANcIER EUROP9EN 47-54 (1993).
188. See BNP, supra note 174, at 35 (describing cross-shareholding between
BNP and UAP); UAP, supra note 174, at 63 (describing how certain sales in the
health, homeowners' and automobile insurance is made through BNP branches).
189. See BNP, supra note 174, at 53-54; UAP, supra note 174, at 19.
190. Id.; see also Morin, supra note 134, at 128-29 (observing that, pursuant to
agreements between Dresdner and BNP, cross-shareholdings will rise to the 10%
level).
191. See UAP, supra note 174, at 19-20 (discussing cross-shareholding).
192. In BNP's case, some of these companies are involved in cross-
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stable shareholders own approximately 40% of each of BNP
and UAP's capital.
Two of the privatized industrial companies, Rh6ne-Poulenc
and Elf, exhibit a somewhat similar structure. However, these
companies do not have significant cross-shareholdings with one
or more financial institutions; rather, financial institutions
simply number among their owners. These companies are less
important in the examination of the transformation of French
corporate governance because the state remains a significant
direct or indirect shareholder of them. Thus, Rh6ne-Poulenc's
two major investors, Credit. Lyonnais and AGF, are both financial institutions and government-owned (albeit on the list
for privatization), and together control approximately 14% of
Rh6ne-Poulenc. 9 3 The government also continues to own 13%
of Elf. In both companies, a small group of1 4other companies
together owns 10% of their capital and votes.

shareholdings. Thus, Saint-Gobain (a company privatized in 1986) owns approximately 1.8% of BNP, which owns approximately 3% of Saint-Gobain. Similar
cross-holding occurs in Pechiney (State-owned), Rhone-Poulenc (privatized in 1993),
G~ndrale des Eaux (private), and Saint Louis (private). Other members of the
group include two Kuwaiti investment funds, General Electric Investment Corporation, Elf, Dassault, Peugeot Citroen, Renault, BAT and Hoffman Laroche groups.
BNP, supra note 174, at 10; Morin, supra note 134, at 128.
There are fewer cross-holdings in UAP, but this third level of companyowners includes some of the same companies as are in BNP's group (e.g., Gn6rale
des Eaux, Saint-Gobain, Peugeot group company). It also includes the Caisse des
Depots et Consignations (state financial company), Credit Local de France, a company in the Albert Freres group, Meiji Mutual Life, and Westdeutsche
Landesbank. See BNP, supra note 174, at 10.
193. See RHONE-POULENC, supra note 174, at 19. AGF and Credit Lyonnais are
linked in a cross-shareholding arrangement and, as Franqois Morin has remarked,
they, together with Paribas, present another center of financial power in juxtaposition with that of the BNP-UAP-Suez group. See MORIN & DUPUY, supra note 187,
at 50; Morin, supra note 134, at 131; Morin, Les trois p6les, supra note 187, at II.
Given various (highly publicized) troubles with investments it has recently experienced, Cr6dit Lyonnais will likely not be privatized in the near future. See Peter
Gumbel, France's Bureaucracy Finds it Hard to Stop Meddling in Industry, WALL
ST. J., June 20, 1994, at Al. By contrast, AGF's privatization has been approved
by the government, but no timetable for it has been set. See David Buchan,
Balladur Pledge on Renault Sell-Off as Profits Rise 125%, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 3,
1994, at 22 (speculating that delay is due to AGF's recent adverse financial results).
194. For Rh6ne-Poulenc, this group includes Soci6t6 Gndrale, BNP, the insurance company AXA, Credit Suisse and a company in the Fiat Group. RHONEPOULENC, supra note 174, at 19. The Elf stable shareholder group consists of
UAP, BNP, Socidt6 G6n6rale de Belgique, Soci6t6 financibre pour l'Expansion de
l'Industrie, AXA, Paribas, Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole, Compagnie
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What, then, are the purposes and effects of this stable
shareholder structure?19 First, a pure market discipline or
market for corporate control cannot affect, without hindrance,
these privatized companies. If one or two investors own 15-20%
of a company, and if a slightly larger group owns an additional
10-20%, with the rest of the shares dispersed among small
shareholders, 9 ' a buyer will experience great difficulty obtaining control of the company through open market purchases
and a hostile takeover. This difficulty will be enhanced by the
fact that many of the companies, whether in the "inner" or
"outer" group of stable shareholders, are linked to the target
company by cross-shareholdings. In addition, members of the
noyau dur customarily enter into agreements generally providing that, for the first several years, its members are free to sell
only a small percentage of their shares, and also, up to five
years following the purchase, other noyau dur members have a
right of first refusal as to offered shares.'97 Given that man-

Nationale A Portefeuille and the Union des Banques Suisses. ELF, supra note 50,
at 18. Arguably, both companies could fall within UAP-BNP-Suez's group of industrial companies.
Given that the French government has only partially privatized Renault, I
do not include it in the above noyau dur analysis. As in Elf, the French government retained a significant share position. See France, in PR1VATISATION INT'L,
Feb. 1, 1995, available in Westlaw, PRVINT Database.
. 195. This consideration is significant in the 1993 privatizations because,
unlike
the 1986 privatizations, many stable shareholders are no longer under government
control. The full effect of the stable shareholder mechanism on French corporate
governance is only now beginning to be seen because fewer and fewer large companies, particularly banks, who belong to stable shareholder groups are remaining
under the control of the state. In the 1986 privatization, by contrast, arguably
state control continued in many cases despite the privatization because of the
state ownership of members of the stable shareholder group.
196. Some of the publicly-held shares are in fact owned by employees of the
privatized company or of its subsidiaries and are thus in friendly hands. Other
shareholders that would likely vote to oppose a takeover would include SICAVs
managed by banks belonging to the dominant financial shareholders.
197. For example, the stable shareholder agreement in Rh6ne-Poulenc is described as follows:
These investors will adhere to, and a certain number of existing shareholders (collectively, the "Stable Shareholders") have entered into, an
agreement (the "protocole") with the intention of assuring the cohesion
and stability of the shareholder base of the Company. The parties to the
protocole have designated the Company to manage the protocole in order
to assure that each party complies with its terms. According to the
protocole, each Stable Shareholder is required to keep the Shares subject
to the protocole held by it for at least three months, and to keep at least
80% of such Shares for a further 15 months, beginning on November 26,
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agement of privatized companies is rumored to have a "say" in
the composition of the stable shareholder group, and given the
dominant position of management in French companies, the
purpose of the stable shareholder structure could be a management entrenchment device. 198
In response to suggestions that the core shareholder structure entrenches management, some have argued that it is
needed in a market of traditionally small capitalization and
one relatively lacking in domestic institutional investors similar to United States pension funds. In other words, because
individual investors are still not regularly in the French capital market and because French institutional investors, such as
SICAVs and pension funds, are only gradually increasing their
investments, the French government and company management must turn to existing companies for the bulk of company
financing. 9 9 This structure should not be an obstacle to full
market liberalization because the stable shareholder agreement is for a set term. °0
1993. Following the expiration of such period of 18 months and for a
further period of three years, transfers of 80% of such Shares by any
Stable Shareholder will be subject to a right of first refusal in favor of
the other Stable Shareholders.
RHONE-POULENC, supra note 174, at 18.
198. See Bauer, supra note 113, at 59 ("Lastly, there is the fact that, in choosing the members of the 'stable nucleus,' the Minister of Finances was very sensitive to the wishes of the management of the privatised firms."). Occasionally, the
selection of a PDG for a privatized company occurs shortly before the actual privatization. See BNP, supra note 174, at 52 (Michel Pebereau was selected as PDG
of BNP approximately 5 months before its privatization). Nonetheless, it is likely
that new management would especially have a say in the identity of the core
shareholder group.
199. See, e.g., France Will Keep Some 13 Percent of Elf After Sale, Reuters Eur.
Bus. Rep., Jan. 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLEUR File (the
structure gives companies time to adjust to life in the market); John Ridding,
Hard Core or Soft Centre, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1994, at 21 (citing French market
officials who explain that the structure is necessitated by the absence of U.S.-like
institutional investors in France). See also GRAHAM & PROSSER, supra note 150, at
155 ("What was the purpose of the hard cores? Their presence was ostensibly a
reflection of the lack of large institutional shareholders in France in comparison
with the United Kingdom.").
200. See Ridding, supra note 199 (pointing out the limited term of the agreements). But see ELF, supra note 50, at 18 ("Such additional three-year period [for
right of first refusal] will be thereafter automatically renewed for an unlimited
number of periods unless a Stable Shareholder gives written notice to the Company by registered mail, at least three months prior to the end of any such period,
stating such Stable Shareholder's intention to cease to be a party to the
protocole."). It has been pointed out that the percentages owned by many of the
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If the stable shareholder structure constitutes only a stage
on the way to full market liberalization, one would expect to
see the ownership of non-core investors gradually increase. The
evidence, however, is to the contrary, and much remains to be
done to encourage increased non-core shareholder involvement
in the market. °1 Thus, privatized companies arguably remain free from capital market competition and their managers
from the monitoring of owners other than members of the
stable group. Because privatized companies are often in turn
members of stable shareholder groups of their own core shareholders, privatization may have reproduced, at a favorable
price,' °2 an oligarchy of companies, somewhat reminiscent of
stable shareholders are so small (e.g., between .5% and 2.5%) that no one shareholder had enough control or incentive to present effective resistance to an unwanted hostile takeover. See KERNINON, supra note 94, at 43; see also Guyon,
supra note 117, at 395 (discussing the established legality of shareholder agreements among the core group and observing that "il est conforme A l'intdrdt social
que des pactes conclus entre les principaux actionnaires, dont font souvent partie
les investisseurs institutionnels, confierent une certaine stabilit6 au conseil
d'administration afro de permettre la rdalisation d'objectifs A long terme.").
201. Michel Bauer observed that, in the 1986 privatizations, apart from the
possibility of receiving bonus shares if purchased shares were held for a set period, small shareholders were not encouraged to remain shareholders. He explains
that "[s]mall shareholders were allowed to provide important new financial resources but were unable to exert any influence on the privatised firms." Bauer, supra
note 113, at 54. Accordingly, many small shareholders resold their shares to take
advantage of the offering discount, and many core shareholders increased their
holding. See id. at 58; see also KERNINON, supra note 94, at 42 n.66 ("Ils [statistics] t~moignent que le rachat de titres c~d~s par les petits porteurs a permis aux
membres des groupes d'actionnaires stables qui en ont eu ]a volont6 d'assurer
vritablement leur emprise sur les firmes concern~es, en donnant par l m~me
toute sa signification A leur presence."); LASKINE, supra note 152, at 18 (discussing
failure of past privatizations to maintain small shareholders in capital of company). Although French market authorities have directed much effort at having small
shareholders maintain their shareholding positions, and although privatizations
have been generally popular, reports are that a large percentage of purchasers
continue to resell quickly to take advantage of the discount. See France: French
Sell-offs to Quicken After Elfs Runaway Success, EUROWEEK, Feb. 18, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTLNE File.
202. Core shareholders pay a "control" premium for their shares, and thus their
price generally exceeds that of shares offered to the public and to international
investors. However, the price has still been under the current market price for the
shares. For example, in Elf, the last reported market price before the offering was
FF 415 per share, while the core shareholders paid FF 411 per share. See ELF,
supra note 50, at cover, 18. This discount may be compensation for the lack of
liquidity for the purchased shares. Moreover, the Privatization Commission and the
Minister of the Economy do not necessarily take the best offers, as opposed to
those offering strategic advantages. See Morin, supra note 134, at 129 (explaining
how, from the evidence of the BNP's privatization, the government opted for a
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the pre-World War trusts, that produce benefits primarily for
its members and locks French capitalism into a small circle of
companies and owners.2" 3 This oligarchy is reinforced by the
elitist training and background of the managers and directors.204
A critical question in French corporate governance today is
whether the stable shareholder and cross-holding structure
must result in an oligarchy controlling a large segment of the
French economy. The structure may simply suggest a different
kind of corporate governance that does not exclude the market
and its discipline. In this view, as a result of the
privatizations, coalitions of large, formerly state-owned financial institutions replace the state as the primary relational
investors for industrial companies.2 5 In contrast to traditional practices, these financial institutions do not simply provide
equity capital to the industrial firms in an effort to become the
primary lender and investment bank for the companies. Rather, their role as significant shareholders offers benefits to both
sides: (i) the financial institutions develop a source of return,
both from the investments and from fees from financial advice,
and (ii) the companies receive this investment and advice, as
well as other services provided by the institutions, and can
develop long-range plans with the strategic guidance of the
banks.20 6 These financial institution-industry links do not

strategic use of the stable shareholder group, rather than using a market viewpoint of taking the highest bidders).
203. See Bauer, supra note 113, at 59 ("France is a long way from the free
market: it has reconstituted between 1986 and 1988, in many cases in identical
fashion, the traditional structures of French capitalism: 'a capitalism without capital and without sanctions. ').
204. See id. at 59-60.
205. See Morin, supra note 134, at 126-27. In Morin's view, the financial institutions that provide the relational investing are not single banks, but related
groups of world-class financial institutions. Thus, he sees that, as a result of the
1993-1994 privatizations, a group centered around BNP and UAP has been, formed,
with a further involvement of the Compagnie de Suez, a financial conglomerate
privatized in 1987 (which also includes the large Indosuez banking group). See id.
at 126-31. Juxtaposed with this group are other emerging groups: the Cr6dit
Lyonnais-AGF-Paribas group, whose emergence is hindered by state ownership of
the first two prongs; and a group formed around Soci~t6 G6ndrale. For a discussion of the concept that this financial group structure constitutes another kind of
capitalism, see MICHEL ALBERT, CAPITALISME CONTRE CAPITALISME (1991); OLIVIER
PASTRI, LES NOUVEAUX PILIERS DE LA FINANCE (1992).

206. See ALBERT, supra note 205, at 126-27; MORIN & DUPL'Y, supra note 187,
at 3. In fact, the equity involvement by banks is almost a necessity for survival in
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prevent companies from going to capital markets; in fact, much
of their financing may come from such sources. Thus, although
a company's strategy will be formed in conjunction with the
financial institutions' oversight, the capital markets would
provide the ultimate check that even banks could not ignore if
capital market investors turned to other, more productive uses
of capital.2 07
It may then be a natural, and understandable, step from
state ownership and relational investing to similar ownership
and investing on the part of newly privatized large financial
institutions bound in elaborate networks of cross-ownership
with industrial companies. However, concerns (in addition to
the worry about the creation of a financial oligarchy) have
surfaced. There is little political legitimacy for the new control
structures, especially given that they are replacing a framework sanctioned by a democratic process." 8
More significant from the French domestic economic perspective is whether the structures will lead to a lack of competition and innovation, due to a too great reliance on strategic
advice and financing provided in the closed networks. The
danger from these closed networks is that industry will be
forced to return to state ownership because of economic crises
partly brought on by this closed vision.0 9 The potential lack

an economic environment where banks' profitability from its traditional lending
activity is decreasing. See Jean-Michel Paguet, Les Conglomdrats Financiers en
Europe, Stratdgie et Concurrence, 28 REVUE D'ECONOMIE FINANcitRE 7 (1994) (discussing the reasons for the creation of large financial conglomerates in Europe).
The structure provides a company with shareholders who will allow management's
long-term plans to develop and who must look to the long term for their return.
See, e.g., Gail Counsell, A Very Private Privatisation; Gail Counsell Reports on the
Nationalistic Nature of the French Sell-Off, INDEPENDENT, July, 21, 1993, available
in LEXIS, Europe Library, INDPNT File (quoting Jean-Pierre Tirouflet finance
director of Rh6ne-Poulenc) ("In our mind it is not a means of protection, it's more
like a mirror, someone you can discuss with, have a dialogue with, and share your
strategy and make decisions with. I feel that is very important to us. It is in that
way we feel a group of permanent shareholders can be very useful to us.").
207. Cf MORIN & DUPUY, supra note 187, at 3-4 (explaining that French capitalism is between the two systems of capital market and bank financing). Moreover, product market competition would similarly discipline the companies.
208. See Morin, supra note 134, at 131 ("mais le pilotage de ce coeur [financier] ne s'annonce-t-il pas d'ores et d6jh fragile, voire contestable, en raison du
manque de ldgitimation claire de ses principaux responsables?"); Morin, supra note
187, at II (La dbmocratie pourra-t-elle se montrer longtemps indiffdrente aux
formes redoutables de ce nouveau pouvoir dconomique?").
209. See DURUPTY, supra note 93, at 131 ("Ainsi, ]a dimension assez rdduite du
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of accountability of participants in this closed structure could
lead to abuses, such as the ones that seem to be reported
weekly in the recent French press, that would undermine confidence in French corporate governance and injure the reputation of France's capital market.21° These issues are all significant, because given the stable shareholder structure, corporate
governance dominated by financial institutions is prevailing
over a system of capital market discipline, although the issue
is far from resolved.
C. United States InstitutionalInvestors and French Privatization
Did United States institutional shareholders, with their
market orientation and activism, have any effect on corporate
governance in recent French privatization? Were they at all
interested and successful in forcing the French corporate governance to choose between the two paths available to it; financial institution or capital market monitoring? Let us consider
answers to these questions, after first briefly reviewing the

capitalisme frangais peut renforcer la concentration financi~re et le pouvoir
6conomique de quelques groupes, tout en d6bouchant sur les ddfauts antdrieurs
aux nationalisations de 1982: recours excessif h I'Etat-providence et insuffisance de
la politique d'investissement."); Morin, Les trois poles, supra note 187, at II (speaking of the potential "ossification" of the groups); Paguet, supra note 206, at 23
(discussing how groups could lessen competition by preventing advantageous financing to companies outside their sphere).
210. The recent series of abuses in France among company officials, often in
connection with political bribery and personal benefits, has raised the question
concerning the lack of accountability of corporate management. It may point to
inherent problems with a closed system in itself, as well as one that retains "hidden" connections with the government. See, e.g., Thomas Kamm, Latest in Wave of
French Scandals Puts Pressure on Industry Minister to Resign, WALL ST. J., Sept.
21, 1994, at All (describing numerous scandals in management of large French
public companies, many of which are related to political bribery); Alice Rawsthorn,
French Business Chiefs 'Suspect Corruption Rife,' FIN. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1994, at 12
(describing poll of French company chairmen in which "[tiwo out of three executives suspect that illegal practices are rife in many companies").
As both Morin and Paguet suggest, the financial networks do not limit their
reach to France; they have formed connections with other European countries (e.g.,
BNP-Dresdner). Thus, the question arises whether the market will police such
conglomerates or whether the conglomerates will distort the structure of the markets. See Paguet, supra note 206, at 18-26 (inquiring whether the growth of European financial conglomerates could injure product market competition in industry
and enhance systemic risk to payment systems).
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investment of United States institutional investors in French
privatized companies.
1. Sales to United States Institutional Investors
By most reports, the initial privatizations following the
1993 legislation met with a warm reception among United
States institutional investors." This may have been due to
attractive sales price (i.e., prices under.the market valuation
for shares). Moreover, United States institutional investors
were not offered an unlimited supply of shares. Because most
shares were offered and sold to French retail investors, only
approximately 5% of the shares in any given privatization have
ever been offered to United States institutions.
In the BNP privatization, shares were sold in the United
States, only to United States institutional investors in a Rule
144A offering, at a discount of approximately FF 37 per share,
with such investors reported to have purchased approximately
$147 million in shares.212 The discounts in the next offerings,
Rh6ne-Poulenc and Elf, were not as significant (FF 4 and FF
12 per share, respectively), and in each case United States
investors were sold approximately 20% of the portion of the
shares offered to international investors.1 3 The UAP offering
had an even smaller discount (FF 3 per share) and, as in BNP,
the United States offering was restricted to United States
institutional investors. 4
211. See, e.g., U.S. Fund Managers Plan to Boost Foreign Investment, supra
note 49 (discussing Broadgate consultants survey results that American fund managers wish to participate in French privatizations). See also France-ForeignEconomic Trends, MARKET REP., Dec. 20, 1993, available in LEXIS, Europe Library,
ALLEUR File (reporting that U.S. investors are the largest foreign investors in
France).
212. See Susan Scherreik, Stocks: Only Funds Get Shot at Hot French Offerings, N.Y. TIES, Oct. 9, 1993, at A38.
213. See France: Foreign Shareholders Hold Between 20% and 25% of El's
Capital, AGENCE EUR., Mar. 1, 1994, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, TXTWE
File (discussing Elf); Rosie Shepperd, France: Rhne-Poulenc Float Reaches Triumphant Finale; Jumbo Elf Offer Starts to Warm Up, EUROWEEK, Nov. 26, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLEUR File (discussing Rh6ne-Poulenc offering).
214. See UAP, supra note 174, at cover (for French public offering price and
price to international investors). American institutional investors purchased 2.7% of
the 54.4 million offered UAP shares. U.S. investor demand was characterized as
"unenthusiastic." CNP to Follow UAP Success and AGF, PRIVATISATION INT'L, July

1, 1994, available in Westlaw, PRVINT Database. U.S. institutional investors pur-
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2. United States Institutional Investors' Concern With, and
Effect on, French Corporate Governance
The simple fact of the limited need for United States institutional investor funds perhaps explains why, so far at least,
they have had little effect on the transformation of French
corporate governance. Available evidence suggests that United
States institutional investors were concerned about the ownership structure of the privatized companies and about the possible adverse effects on corporate governance resulting from this
structure.2 15 They liked neither the continued French government share ownership and the golden share, nor the domination of privatized companies by French financial institutions
through the stable shareholder group."' In their view, these
corporate governance techniques weakened their own position
as shareholders because they made more likely negative
externalities for non-controlling shareholders (e.g., the company would serve the purposes of the French government and the
stable shareholders, or those of management, at the expense of
other shareholders).
chased 10.6% of Renault shares recently offered in its partial privatization. France,
supra note 194.
The privatization law limits sales to foreigners in any offering to 20% of
the capital of the company in question. Loi no. 93-923 du 19 Juillet 1993 [Law
No. 93-923 of July 19, 1993], art. 8, J.O., July 21, 1993, at 10255, 1993 D.S.L.
396. Given the large size of this limit and the focus of the offerings on the French
retail market (as well as private sales to stable shareholders), practically it does
not restrict sales to U.S. institutional investors. Moreover, it applies only upon
initial sales; it does not affect purchases by international investors in the secondary market.
Although the above statistics give a rough idea of sales to U.S. institutional
investors in the initial privatizations, they are incomplete (e.g., such investors
could purchase shares in the secondary market, as well as through overseas subsidiaries in the primary market).
215. See, e.g., U.S. Fund Managers Plan to Boost Foreign Investment, supra
note 49 (discussing Broadgate consultants' report of a concern among fund managers of corporate governance issues in French companies); USA: Seminars for
French PrivatisationProgramme, AGEFI, July 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLEUR File ("It would appear some of the large U.S. institutional
investors are now voicing their dissatisfaction with the way they feel they are
being treated as shareholders in French companies.").
216. See, e.g., Resener, supra note 23, at 50 (referring to the opposition of
Richard Koppes, general counsel of CalPERS, to use of the "golden share" technique); see also L'Interview: Howard D. Sherman, BULLETIN DE L'AGENCE
FINANci RE DE NEW YORK [B.F.N.Y.], Jan. 1995, at 2, 3 (in an interview with
French embassy officials in New York, Mr. Sherman of ISS refers to institutional
investors' hostility to the golden share and stable shareholder groups).
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United States institutions had global proxy and investor
information specialists examine French privatization and identify problems in it. For example, the IRRC conducted numerous seminars for United States institutional investors on
French privatization.2 17 Moreover, certain investors commissioned the IRRC to prepare a report on the privatization, with
a special focus on corporate governance issues. In preparing
the report, IRRC personnel, with the help of D6minor, met
with Government and company officials to discuss United
States institutional investor concerns."'
Certain institutional investors took the additional step of
speaking directly with French government and company authorities. Professor John C. Coffee's observation that public
pension funds are likely to take the lead in any activism again
rings true. CalPERS' Richard Koppes, accompanied by Global
Proxy Services Joseph Lufkin, traveled to France before the
first privatization was launched specifically to see management
of companies on the privatization list and to discuss corporate
governance matters with French government authorities.2 19
Despite efforts by some United States institutional investors (i.e., an occasional protest from CalPERS), these investors,
as a whole, had little influence on corporate governance in the
French privatization, particularly on the stable shareholder
structure."' French government and company officials occa-

217. See, e.g., Lisa R. Gerson, Foreign Investors Buffeted by French Privatization, ISSUE ALERT, Feb. 1994, at 5 (in this Institutional Shareholder Services publication, author describes corporate governance problems in French privatization);
USA: Seminars for French Privatisation Programme, supra note 215 (referring to
IRRC seminars); see also INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, INC., GLOBAL
PROXY REVIEW: 4TH QUARTER 1993, at 29 (1994); INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER
SERVICES, INC., GLOBAL PROXY REVIEW: 3RD QUARTER 1993, at 40 (1993); INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, INC., GLOBAL PROXY REVIEW: 2ND QUARTER 1993,
at 22 (1993) (highlighting issues related to various French privatizations).
218. Telephone Interview with Robin Meszoli, supra note 64. The IRRC report,
which was a collective project with Deminor, is not publicly available. However,
Ms. Meszoli reports that it includes a description of the current privatization, a
review of key corporate governance issues, a summary of key accounting differences between French and U.S. companies and a profile of the companies on the
privatization list.
219. Lufkin Interview, supra note 60. In Mr. Lufkin's view, only the largest
U.S. institutional investors can hope to have any influence on corporate governance of non-U.S. companies. He adds that, even in sophisticated institutions such
as CalPERS, there may be little familiarity with foreign corporate governance.
220. Both Mr. Lufkin and Ms. Meszoli report that government officials did not
seem particularly receptive to U.S. institutional shareholders' corporate governance
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sionally attempted to explain that corporate governance structures, such as the noyau dur, were temporary, as if to mollify
the United States institutional investors."' However, these
investors did not shun the privatizations. Perhaps this suggests that given the offering discount and the economic fundamentals of the companies,222 the deals were too good to pass
up for the institutions despite any corporate governance concerns."' In fact, one United States institutional investor, the
General Electric Investment Corporation, even became a member of BNP's stable shareholder group.224
D. ConcludingRemarks
It is perhaps no surprise that United States institutional
investors have so far had little influence on corporate governance in French privatization. Numerous economic and cultural factors deflect their impact in France. Despite the recent

concerns. Recently, however, French government and market authorities are showing more interest both in the concerns of U.S. institutional investors and in corporate governance generally. See, e.g., MARIE-NO9LLE DOMPE & ALAIN DORISON,
QUATRIbfME TABLE RONDE: MARCHiS 2001: ENTRETIENS DE LA COB (1994) (discuss-

ing corporate governance in U.S., U.K. and France); L'Interview: Howard D.
Sherman, supra note 216, Les placements des investisseurs institutionnels aux
Ektats-Unis, B.F.N.Y., Jan. 1995, at 3; Les marches financiers, B.F.N.Y., Jan. 1995,
at 10 (entire issue devoted to U.S. institutional investors).
221. See Ridding, supra note 199 (discussing views in France that, in time,
French markets would more likely evolve into an Anglo-Saxon market for corporate control).
222. Telephone Interview with William Wright, Principal, Morgan Stanley &
Co. Inc. (Mar. 9, 1994) (explaining that institutional investors often made a decision to "buy the country" and were thus motivated to purchase based upon economic fundamentals).
223. According to Joseph Lufkin, one should keep in mind that personnel in
U.S. institutional investors who are responsible for making the investments are
generally not the same people responsible for following corporate governance matters. Thus, in his view, investments are generally made in these institutions purely on the basis of economic fundamentals, with little attention given to corporate
governance that might be of more concern to those who oversee proxy voting.
Thus, liquidity and return are of central concern to these decision makers. A critical question is whether legally U.S. institutional investors can continue to ignore
corporate governance when making an initial investment. Lufkin Interview, supra
note 60.
224. In the BNP privatization, the General Electric Investment Corporation (for
the account of the trustees of the General Electric Pension Fund, of Elfun Trusts
and of Elfun Global fund) became a member of the stable shareholder group and
purchased about .75% of BNP's shares (or 1,391,473 shares). See BNP, supra note
174, at 10.
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increased emphasis placed in the French economy and French
companies on global competitiveness, nearly fifty years of active state economic domination does not end overnight. Moreover, the tradition of a relatively closed circle of ownership of
large companies is an old one in France, and this tradition,
which may be reappearing as financial institutions replace the
state as the center of corporate financing and strategic direction, runs counter to the market orientation of United States
institutional investors. In addition, the shared background,
training and culture of French executives and board members
reinforce this tradition, as well as serve to maintain connections with a state that, despite the privatization, could continue to exert some macroeconomic influence over the privatized
companies.
United States institutional investors have also so far not
been in a position of economic strength in France. Their funds
made the initial privatizations successful, but were not essential in a process relying upon domestic and other European
investors. In addition, the differing interests among United
States investors mean that they can often be "sold" on a privatization because of a price discount, or economic fundamentals,
regardless of potential corporate governance problems. In fact,
considering the domestic focus of the French privatizations and
the lack of unity among United States institutional investors,
it would have been a surprise if they had influenced French
corporate governance through the process.
At this stage in French privatization, therefore, the investigation into United States institutional investor influence on
French corporate governance is somewhat premature. Because
the "best" companies on the privatization list were sold in the
first round, future privatizations may likely involve some companies that may not be as financially attractive." 5 Accordingly, institutional investors may be in a stronger bargaining
position when their funds are solicited, especially if French

225. For example, weekly press reports describe restructuring and other problems with major companies on the French government's privatization list. See
Buchan, supra note 193, at 22 (describing AGF's "inopportune drop in first half
net profits"); Martin du Bois, P6chiney Emerges as Test of France's Will to Privatize, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 1994, at B4 (describing how privatization of this company must await "lower[ing] costs, reduc[ing] a mountain of debt, possibly divestling]
underperforming assets and expand[ing] the company's reach to growth markets in
Asia and Latin America."); Rawsthorn, supra note 109.
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retail interest in privatization falters." 6 Moreover, with the
help of groups such as IRRC, ISS, Global Proxy Services,
D6minor, and Franklin Global Investors, United States institutional investors may become educated about foreign investments so as to insist that corporate governance matters be part
of the investment decision.22 7 This education could lead to
some form of collective action on their part, perhaps under the
leadership of a public pension fund.
However, my suspicion is that even in the circumstances
outlined above, United States institutional investors will not
be the agents for significant changes in French corporate governance. The changes, if they are to come at all, would originate from complex French and European cultural, social and
political forces, either compatible with a movement to a market
capitalism and a market for corporate control, or with the continued emergence of a capitalism of financial institution centers. The activism of French groups of small shareholders and
organizations for significant minority shareholders may contribute to the change. More importantly, if French authorities
continue to develop the Bourse as a rival to London's capital
market, the success of this market could undermine a domination of companies by large financial institutions that relegate
other shareholders to a second class position.2 And, as Professor Karmel has observed in another context, the strongest
factor for change could be the growth of local, or regional, institutional investors more concerned about total investment return than other kinds of profits arising from an institution's

226. See France: Elf Sale was a Success, supra note 174 (questioning whether
the French public's enthusiasm for privatization is waning).
227. It is interesting to note that the new chief executive at CalPERS has
stated that he plans to extend the fund's corporate activism to Europe and Japan.
See Ralph T. King, Jr., CalPERS Names Burton to Succeed Hanson as Chief,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1994, at B2; Eric Schine, CalPERS' New Chief Same Fire,
Less Flash, Bus. WK., Oct. 3, 1994, at 114 (describing Burton's hiring of a chief
investment officer who is "busy arranging trips to Europe and Japan to bring
religion to boards of overseas corporations, where a growing portion of CalPERS'

assets are invested.").
228. This statement is subject to qualification. If the 'second class" position
ensures a steady total return, it may be that even new French institutional investors (many of whom will have organizational allegiance with the dominant financial institutions) would be content with this position. After all, investors in Japanese markets, admittedly dominated by large financial concerns, have not always
suffered from their investments.
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relationship with a company." 9 In this respect, the European
Union, with its liberal, free market orientation, could place
significant pressure upon a closed ownership structure for
French privatized companies.
Thus, if these influences lead to change in French corporate governance, United States institutional investors' activism
could provide support. Generally, this supporting role would
likely resemble what occurs today in isolated disputes with
French corporate management and is the path preferred by the
investors themselves. Moreover, without a local French interest to follow, the United States investors always run the risk
of provoking a nationalist reaction to their activism.
However, the triumph in France of an American-style
market capitalism and a market for corporate control is by no
means certain. With all of the cultural and historical factors
weighing in its favor, the capitalism of financial institution
"poles" or centers appears to be emerging as the dominant
form in France with a subsidiary capital market. If this capitalism were to evidence its benign face-a long-term focus,
steady investment returns and lack of management abuse,23
as opposed to the current malevolent face that has recently appeared, then United States institutional investors may well be
content to support it and occupy a subsidiary role, so long as
they have a liquid market for their investments. They might
even be attracted to this capitalism because of its long-term
focus. Like the General Electric Investment Corporation, they
may increasingly join forces with French financial institutions
in a capitalism defined by its opposition to complete capital
market discipline.

229. See Roberta S. Karmel, supra note 132, at 3, 16 ("The creation of large
private pension funds in France and Italy, where there is serious government
interest in supplementing retirement savings this way, could similarly lead to the
development of a constituency favoring investor interest.").
230. This is the capitalism described by Michel Albert (PDG of AGF and board
member of numerous other French companies) in his CAPITALISME CONTRE
CAPITALISME, supra note 205, at 117-46. In his view, with the defeat of communism, the economic world is now engaged in a struggle between two forms of
capitalism, Anglo-Saxon market-based capitalism against bank-financing capitalism
typical of the Continent and Japan.
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VI. CONCLUSION

As corporate law scholars have become interested in the
role of institutional investors in corporate governance, they
have looked to activities of similarly situated investors in other
countries. As Reinier Kraakman has observed, this comparative corporate governance research first led scholars to observe
forms of institutional activism present abroad and to speculate
on whether these forms could be used in the United States. In
the course of this analysis, scholars came to appreciate that a
particular foreign solution to the Berle-Means corporate agency
problem is invariably a product of, and deeply imbedded in, a
given cultural, historical and political context. Comparative
corporate governance studies thus help explain the complexity
of a foreign corporate governance system and of its answers to
the agency problem, while providing a warning that these
solutions are not readily transferable.
Yet these very institutional investors that inspired scholars to look abroad for models for United States institutional
investor activism are now keeping attention focused upon foreign corporate governance. An increasing percentage of their
investments is devoted to non-United States companies. In the
globalization of their portfolio, they are only following the
dictates of a portfolio theory that demands a global diversification of assets. In ever increasing numbers, foreign markets are
proving efficient and providing the liquidity desired by these
investors. Moreover, an increasing number of countries and
companies, many of Western European origin, that are engaged in ambitious privatization programs are soliciting their
funds.
The focus on foreign corporate governance that results
from present United States institutional foreign investment is
raising new issues, such as the impact of their activism in a
complex foreign context. That corporate governance is even an
issue in their foreign investment owes much to evolving legal
standards for money management that increasingly mandate
attention to this subject. United States institutional investors
are also finding that their participation in foreign corporate
governance is becoming less costly. Moreover, a "global proxy"
industry has arisen to serve them in their foreign activism.
Because of this investment strategy by United States institutional investors, scholars are thus drawn to explore foreign
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corporate governance in considerable detail. As I have shown
in this Article from a consideration of French corporate governance, this exploration cannot satisfactorily be limited to an
economic account. Rather, we have seen that French government ownership and control of large public companies belongs
to a long tradition of state involvement in the French economy
as well as owes its recent manifestation to a response to the
economic devastation caused by World War II. This ownership
in turn led to various solutions to the corporate agency problem, from state domination of management to a collaboration
between the state and management on long-range goals for a
company. Moreover, the tradition of state control has been
solidified, and the relationships between the various human
actors "bonded," by the common background, training and
professional careers of the high civil servants and company
executives.
This examination has also revealed that French and European pressures may change French corporate governance. A
resurgence of a liberal market orientation and the financial
inability of the French state to fund private companies are
leading to a gradual abandonment of the French state from its
role in the system. In addition, a desire by the French government and market authorities to develop a capital market competitive with any in Europe arguably runs counter to domination of public company financing by the State. Finally, there is
the ever present and ever increasing pressure from the European Union, with its economically liberal orientation in capital
and other markets.
Privatization highlights that French corporate governance
is at a critical juncture. Although heralded as a movement in
some ways designed to promote capital markets and a market
orientation, we have seen that French privatization, in certain
instances, did not mean that the state would completely abandon its control of industry. More importantly, French privatization is arguably transforming French corporate governance
from one dominated by the state to one controlled by centers of
financial institutions, linked together and with a group of industrial companies in elaborate cross-holdings. Whether such a
system, which some have suggested represents a different form
of capitalism, will prevail in France and whether it will be
compatible with the market-based capitalism and market for
corporate control that characterize United States markets and,
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to a great extent, the perspective of United States institutional
investors remain to be seen.
A consideration of the results of the contact of the United
States institutional investors with French corporate governance in the privatization suggests that nothing of significance
has so far emerged from this contact. The United States investors participated in the transactions, generally because the
prices were favorable, with occasional complaints about an
emerging French corporate governance of financial institution
dominance. Although United States institutional investors may
become more important in France if there were an increased
need for United States institutional investor funds and if these
investors acted as a coherent group at the structuring phase of
a privatization, the transformation of the French system will
continue to be dominated by French and EU pressures. Moreover, the United States institutional investors may themselves
be "transformed" in the process to accept a role in emerging
financial institution-dominated, French corporate governance.
In sum, United States institutional investors' worldwide
investments are forcing us to educate ourselves about foreign
corporate governance. Given the likelihood that these investments will continue, we have little choice but to follow these
investors if we want to understand developments in global
corporate finance. This orientation is a welcome one. Given the
increasing global nature of the capital markets and investing,
these are changes that we should study as closely as those
occurring in the United States.

